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Minority Action versus Union Exclusivity:
The Need to Harmonize NLRA
and Title VII Policies
By CHARLES B. CRAVER*
[T]he [Labor] Board has not been commissioned to effectuate
the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it
may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional ob-
jectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose
calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to an-
other, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body
that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis
upon its immediate task.1
Congress has vested expert administrative bodies . . .with broad
discretion and has charged them with the duty to execute stated
and specific statutory policies. That delegation does not neces-
sarily include either the duty or the authority to execute numerous
other laws.
2
D URING the 1974-1975 session, the United States Supreme Court
will decide whether and to what extent the National Labor Relations
Board ("Labor Board" or "NLRB") should consider the policies em-
* B.S., 1967, Cornell University; M. Indus. & Labor Rel., 1968, Cornell Uni-
versity School of Industrial and Labor Relations; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida; Member, California Bar.
1. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
2. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79 (1944). The Mc-
Lean Trucking Court, which was specifically concerned with the proper authority of
the ICC, did, however, recognize that a federal administrative agency cannot always
operate in a statutory vacuum: "The Commission's task is to enforce the Interstate
Commerce Act and other legislation which deals specifically with transportation facili-
ties and problems. That legislation constitutes the immediate frame of reference within
which the Commission operates; and the policies expressed in it must be the basic de-
terminants of its action.
"But in executing those policies the Commission may be faced with overlapping
and at times inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation enacted at different
times and with different problems in view. When this is true, it cannot, without more,
ignore the latter. The precise adjustments which it must make, however, will vary from
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bodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 when it interprets
and applies the provisions contained in the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA").4 The particular case,5 which arose in San Francisco,
concerns the propriety, under the NLRA, of independent concerted
activity undertaken by black employees to protest the allegedly dis-
criminatory practices of their employer, where they have concluded
that their collective bargaining representative has not acted to alleviate
the purported problem as effectively and expediently as it could. The
Court's decision could have far-reaching ramifications for minority
workers who are not satisfied with the efforts of their union to elimi-
nate employment discrimination.6
This article will provide a critical evaluation of the result achieved
by the D. C. Circuit in its Emporium opinion and will endeavor to
suggest a workable approach which comports with the policies of both
the NLRA and Title VII, while doing violence to the principles of
neither act. Before turning to the general policies underlying the
NLRA and Title VII and the specific NLRA doctrines relevant to in-
dependent concerted activity by minority employees, the facts of the
Emporium case should be delineated.
instance to instance depending on the extent to which Congress indicates a desire to
have those policies leavened or implemented in the enforcement of the various specific
provisions of the legislation with which the Commission is primarily and directly con-
cerned." Id. at 79-80.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1970), as amended, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
5. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Western Addition
Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3457 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
6. The Court's resolution of the Emporium question could also significantly af-
fect many labor organizations and employers, due to "the new militancy of Negro em-
ployees who are frustrated by what they regard as discriminatory or poor working con-
ditions and by the failure of the almost lily-white union leadership to correct those con-
ditions." Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the
Burger Court, 68 MICH. L. REv. 237, 238 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Racial Equal-
ity]; see also Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bar-
gaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 46-48 (1969); [hereinafter cited as Black
Power]; Hill, Black Protest and the Struggle for Union Democracy, 1 IssuEs IN INDUs-
TRIAL SOCIETY 19 (1969); Henle, Some Reflections on Organized Labor and the New
Militants, 92 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 20 (1969). "Even unions which integrate smoothly
and readily can expect internal racial tensions, not only because of lingering white prej-
udice but because of black militancy as well." Hain, Black Workers Versus White
Unions: Alternate Strategies in the Construction Industry, 16 WAYNE L. Rav. 37, 73
(1969). Therefore, should militant minority dissidents be provided with the protected
freedom to engage in disruptive behavior to protest alleged discrimination, the adverse
effect upon stable union-management relationships could be substantial.
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The Emporium Decision
Facts
The facts in the Emporium case are relatively uncontroverted. 7
The Emporium Company ("Company") operated a retail depart-
ment store, and the Department Store Employees Union ("Union")
was the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the Com-
pany's stock and marketing employees. The applicable collective bar-
gaining agreement contained a broad no-discrimination clause,8 and it
provided a grievance-arbitration mechanism for the resolution of dis-
putes concerning the interpretation and application of the contract.9
It also contained a no-strike provision.10
In early April of 1968,11 Company employees, including Tom
Hawkins and James Hollins, held a series of meetings with Union rep-
resentatives during which they submitted a list of grievances concern-
ing alleged racial discrimination by the Company. They claimed that
promotions had been denied employees because of race, -and they
specifically noted the case of employee Russel Young. Following
these meetings, Union Secretary-Treasurer Walter Johnson designated
a special committee to investigate the charges, and in mid-April, the
committee issued a report which concluded that the Company was dis-
criminating against black employees and the more senior workers. 12
7. For detailed descriptions of facts, see 192 N.L.R.B. at 179-83, and 485 F.2d
at 919-24. See also Note, 72 MICH. L. REv. 313, 316-20 (1973).
8. Section 21(E) of the agreement provided "[nlo person shall be discrimi-
nated against in regard to hire, tenure of employment or job status by reason of race,
color, creed, national origin, age or sex." 485 F.2d at 920 n.3; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180
n.3.
9. Section 5(B) of the contract, which covered a multi-employer group of which
the Company was a member, provided in relevant part: "Any act of any employer,
representative of the Union, or any employee that is interfering with the faithful per-
formance of this agreement . . . may be referred to the Adjustment Board for such
action as the Adjustment Board deems proper, and is permissive within this agreement."
Id. n.4; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180 n.4. The agreement further provided that if the adjust-
ment board, which consisted of Union and employer representatives, was unable to re-
solve a particular dispute within one week, either party could insist upon final and
binding arbitration. Id. n.5; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180 n.5.
10. Section 36(A) of the Agreement provided: "There shall be no strike or lock-
out during the life of this agreement." 192 N.L.R.B. at 180.
11. All dates mentioned herein pertain to 1968, unless otherwise noted.
12. The committee's report stated, inter alia: "Probably the most important mat-
ter raised was the possibility of racial discrimination. This is outlawed under the terms
of the agreement and certainly again in this day and age should not be a problem.
It was the general feeling of almost all present that discrimination is directed against
the Negro employees and the more senior employees, senior, that is, in the point of
age." 485 F.2d at 920 n.6; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180 n.6.
The Union decided that these grievances should be pursued, and
shortly thereafter, Johnson met with the Company labor relations man-
ager who agreed to explore the situation.
In May, a group of ten employees again met with Johnson to dis-
cuss racial discrimination in general and the case of Russel Young in
particular. However, since Young was about to commence his vaca-
tion, it was agreed to postpone further investigatory action until his
return. In early September, Johnson again met with the employees,
including Hawkins and Hollins, and, in the presence of representatives
from the Fair Employment Practices Committee ("FEPC") and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), he an-
nounced that the Union had concluded that discriminatory practices
had been occurring. Johnson further indicated that the Union was
going to demand an adjustment board proceeding and was prepared
to take the matter to arbitration if necessary. Although Johnson noted
that the process would be time-consuming, he emphasized that an
award, once achieved, would produce a "long lasting effect" which
would be of benefit to other minority employees.1"
The dispute resolution procedure enunciated by the Union did
not placate all of the employees. Some expressed frustration with the
situation and requested that the Union picket the Emporium store.
Johnson rejected this proposal, explaining that the Union was bound
to resolve contractual grievances through -the procedure defined in the
bargaining agreement. However, while he further advised the dissat-
isfied employees to follow the adjustment board and arbitration proce-
dure, he did indicate that "individuals could take whatever action they
wanted to as long as it was legal."1 4  The EEOC and FEPC repre-
sentatives also recommended that the contractual grievance-arbitration
process be utilized. The next day, Johnson filed a broad discrimina-
tion grievance indicating the willingness of the Union to proceed to
arbitration immediately.' 5
13. Johnson indicated that the Union was prepared to process grievances pertain-
ing to all of the alleged discriminatory actions. Id. at 921 n.8; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180
n.8.
14. 192 N.L.R.B. at 182. See also 485 F.2d at 921.
15. Johnson's grievance letter, which requested a meeting of the Adjustment
Board to resolve the discrimination grievances, stated, "We specifically charge the Em-
porium with violations of [the antidiscrimination clause] of the Agreement between
the San Francisco Retailers' Council and [the Union]. We have approximately 120
pages of testimony, recorded by a court reporter to substantiate our position.
"We are ready to proceed to immediate arbitration if the Emporium is agreeable."
485 F.2d at 921; 192 N.L.R.B. at 180-81.
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On October 16, an adjustment board meeting was convened.
Union Agent Williams endeavored at the outset to present evidence
of the Company's practices by questioning employees regarding their
individual grievances. However, he was interrupted by Hollins, who,
speaking for himself, Hawkins and two other workers, read a prepared
statement objecting to the prosecution of grievances on an individual
basis. The statement indicated that these four workers would only
act as a group. It further stated that they "wanted to talk to the Presi-
dent of the Emporium and wouldn't talk to anybody else," since their
"main purpose was to talk to the President to try to reach an agree-
ment with him to straighten out the problems and conditions of the
Emporium."1 6 Thereafter, following their refusal to provide any testi-
mony regarding the individual grievances involved, the four people left
the meeting. Furthermore, none of the four attended a second ad-
justment board meeting which was held two days later.
17
A short time later, Hollins went to see the Company president,
requesting that they "talk about a situation that [Hollins] felt should
be discussed about things that were happening among minority em-
ployees at -the store."'18  The president refused to meet with Hollins
and suggested that he instead discuss the matter with the Company
personnel director. However, Hollins declined to follow this sugges-
tion, having previously spoken with the personnel director about the
situation.
On October 22, Hawkins, Hollins and several other employees
conducted a press conference which was attended by representatives
of the press, radio and television. They stated that the Company was
engaging in racist conduct by discriminating against minority em-
ployees, and they indicated their intention to picket the store. Hollins
also read a leaflet which he said they planned to distribute to the pub-
lic, calling for a consumer boycott.
On Saturday, November 2, Hollins, Hawkins, and two other em-
ployees picketed the Emporium from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The
picketing occurred on the employees' own time. There was neither
violence nor incitement to violence, and the entrances to the store
were not obstructed. During their picketing, the four workers des-
16. 485 F.2d at 922. See also 192 N.L.R.B. at 181 n.2.
17. Although the record does not clearly indicate what transpired at the second
adjustment board meeting, it is clear that two minority workers, including Young, were
promoted by the Company in the Fall of 1968 before Hollins and Hawkins engaged
in any picketing activity. 485 F.2d at 922 n.14; 192 N.L.R.B. at 181 n.14.
18. 485 F.2d at 922; 192 N.L.R.B. at 181.
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seminated pamphlets to passersby. 19
After the picketing by the four dissident employees commenced,
a union business agent told Hawkins that the picketers were utilizing
an incorrect approach, and he indicated that they should allow the
Union to handle the matter. At about the same time, Johnson in-
formed Hollins that he did not wish to see him fired, and he indicated
that the only manner in which to resolve the discrimination difficulty
was through arbitration. Hollins reiterated their desire to meet with
the Company president.
On November 7, Hollins and Hawkins were summoned to the of-
fice of the Company labor relations manager, where they were pre-
sented with written warnings to refrain from further picketing or face
the possibility of discharge.2 0 Despite these express warnings, Hawkins




FOR YEARS AT THE EMPORIUM BLACK, BROWN, YELLOW AND RED PEOPLE, HAVE
WORKED AT THE LOWEST LEVELS. TIME AND TIME AGAIN WE HAVE SEEN INTELLIGENT
HARD WORKING BROTHERS AND SISTERS DENIED PROMOTIONS AND BASIC RESPECT.
THE EMPORIUM IS A 20TH CENTURY COLONIAL PLANTATION. THE BROTHERS AND
SISTERS AtE BEING TREATED THE SAME WAY AS OUR BROTHERS ARE BEING TREATED IN THE
SLAVE MINES OF SOUTH AFRICA.
WHENEVER THE RACIST PIG AT THE EMPORIUM INJURES OR HARMS A BLACK SISTER
OR BROTHER, THEY INJURE AND INSULT ALL BLACK PEOPLE. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY
FOR THESE INSULTS. THEREFORE, WE ENCOURAGE ALL OF OUR PEOPLE TO TAKE THEIR
MONEY OUT OF THIS RACIST STORE, UNTIL BLACK PEOPLE HAVE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND
ARE PROMOTED JUSTLY THROUGH-OUT THE EMPORIUM.
WE WELCOME THE SUPPORT OF OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS FROM THE CHURCHES,
UNIONS, SORORITIES, FRATERNITIES, SOCIAL CLUBS, AFRo-AMERICAN INSTITUTE, BLACK
PANTHER PARTY, W.A.C.O. AND THE POOR PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE. 485 F.2d at 922; 192
N.L.R.B. at 181.
20. The warning statement to Hollins was as follows: "On October 22, 1968, you
issued a public statement at a press conference to which all newspapers, radio, and TV
stations were invited. The contents of this statement were substantially the same as
these set forth in the sheet attached. This statement was broadcast on Channel 2 on
October 22, 1968 and station KDIA.
"On November 2nd you distributed copies of the attached statement to Negro cus-
tomers and prospective customers, and to other persons passing by in front of The Em-
porium.
"These statements are untrue and are intended to and will, if continued injure the
reputation of The Emporium.
"There are ample legal remedies to correct any discrimination you may claim to
exist. Therefore, we view your activities as a deliberate and unjustified attempt to in-
jure your employer.
"This is to inform you that you may be discharged if you repeat any of the above
acts or make any similar public statement." 485 F.2d at 923 n.17; 192 N.L.R.B. at
181-82. The message provided to Hawkins was essentially identical.
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lowing Saturday. Accordingly, on Monday, November 11, Hawkins
and Hollins were both terminated.2 1 Thereafter, the Union filed a
protest concerning their discharge, but it did not initiate the unfair
labor practice proceeding.
Proceedings Before NLRB and D. C. Circuit
On November 19, 1968, the Western Addition Community Or-
ganization filed a charge with the Labor Board alleging that the Com-
pany had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA s2 by terminating
Hawkins and Hollins. An unfair labor practice complaint was issued
pursuant to this charge, and a hearing was held before Trial Ex-
aminer 23 William Spencer. The trial examiner concluded that Haw-
kins and Hollins had engaged in concerted activity which had been
induced by a good faith belief that the Company had been discrimi-
nating against racial minorities. 24  He next considered the question of
whether the picketing activities lost the protection of the NLRA by
virtue of the boycott appeal and strong invective directed against the
Company. Though he criticized the language contained in the leaflets
and found "the potential for injury [to the Company] considerable,"
2 5
he did not reach a definitive resolution of the issue. He instead deter-
mined that the actions taken were so inconsistent with and disruptive
21. Their written discharge notices stated, "You are being discharged today. Dis-
tribution of 'Boycott Emporium' literature on Saturday, November 9, 1968, in front of
the Emporium, 855 Market Street, S.F., pursuant to written warning dated 11/7/68
for similar action on 11/2/68." Id. n.18; 192 N.L.R.B. at 182.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), which provides, "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title...." Section 7 of NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title." Sec-
tion 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970), authorizes a labor organ-
ization and an employer to enter into a union security agreement requiring employees
to pay union dues and initiation fees as a condition of continued employment. See
Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734, 742 (1963). See also Toner, The Union Shop Under Taft-Hartley, 5 LAB. L.J.
552 (1954). See generally Note, 52 MrcH. L. Rnv. 619 (1954).
23. Trial examiners are now denoted administrative law judges.
24. The trial examiner's decision is reported in 192 N.L.R.B. at 179.
25. 192 N.L.R.B. at 185. See notes 224 & 271 infra, for further consideration
of the propriety of the boycott appeal and strong language utilized by the picketers.
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of the procedures for resolving grievances under the collective bar-
gaining agreement that it would not effectuate the policies of
the NLRA to extend its protection to such activities.2 6
The trial examiner's critical determination was based upon three
primary factors: (1) the fact that he found "no basis in the evidence
for a finding that the Union approved, endorsed, or in any way con-
nived in the action taken by the four employees; 2 7 (2) the fact "that
this was no mere presentation of a grievance but nothing short of a
demand that the [Company] bargain with the picketing employees for
the entire group of minority employees;"' 2 and (3) the fact that "the
Union, [the picketers'] duly designated bargaining representative, was
endeavoring in every way available to it under the agreement to adjust
any and all cases of racial discrimination brought to its attention. 2 9
From these findings, he succinctly concluded:
[T]o extend the protection of the Act to the two employees
named in the complaint would seriously undermine the right of
the employees to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, handicap and prejudice the employees' duly
designated representative in its efforts to bring about a durable im-
provement in working conditions among employees belonging to
racial minorities, and place on the Employer an unreasonable bur-
den of attempting to placate self-designated representatives of
minority groups while abiding by the terms of a valid bargaining
agreement and attempting in good faith to meet whatever de-
mands the bargaining representative put forth under the agree-
ment.
30
The trial examiner's decision was appealed to the NLRB which
provided the parties with the rarely granted opportunity for oral argu-
ment. Despite this unusual procedure, the three-member majority af-
firmed the trial examiner's decision in a brief statement which wholly
adopted the findings and conclusions of the examiner." Thereafter
26. 192 N.L.R.B. at 186.
27. Id. at 185.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 186.
31. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971). As is true of very many of the
cases decided by the Labor Board, no separate reasons for their holding were provided
by the majority.
Members Brown and Jenkins dissented. Member Brown did not believe that the
picketers' mere attempt to discuss their grievances with the Company constituted any
derogation from the negotiating authority of the designated Union representative. 192
N.L.R.B. at 177-99. Member Jenkins, on the other hand, while conceding that "the
Union may have been exercising the full range of its power and ability to eliminate
racial discrimination," nonetheless employed reasoning quite similar to that subse-
quently utilized by the D. C. Circuit in reversing the majority decision, as he concluded
8 [Vol. 26
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the D. C. Circuit reversed the Labor Board's holding.32
The two-judge majority opinion of the D. C. Circuit, relying sub-
stantially upon the doctrine enunciated in the Southern Steamship de-
cision,33 emphasized the need for the Labor Board to consider the
strong policy implications of Title VII when interpreting and applying
the provisions of the NLRA in cases involving racial discrimination. 3
The majority emphasized that concerted minority activity aimed at the
elimination of racial discrimination cannot detract from or conflict with
the position of the representative labor organization, since Title VII
imposes upon all unions the obligation to endeavor to eradicate expidi-
tiously any such discrimination.3 5  The decision indicated that dissat-
isfied minority employees should attempt to utilize the contractual
grievance-arbitration machinery before resorting to self-help measures,
and it recognized that the record contained no evidence of bad faith
on the part of the Union. 6 It even acknowledged that the Union may
well have proceeded in the manner which it reasonably believed would
produce the optimal and most lasting results.3 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the Union's actions may not have been sufficient,
in light of Title VII considerations, to warrant the withdrawal
of NLRA protection from the activities engaged in by the dissident
picketers, and it ordered the case remanded to the NRLB so that it
could apply the majority's newly enunciated standard. s
[T]he Labor Board should inquire, in cases such as this, whether
the union was actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest
extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means.
Where the union's efforts fall short of this high standard, the mi-
nority group's concerted activities cannot lose its [sic] section 7
protection.3"
that where minority employees are protesting race discrimination, they are to be pro-
vided with extremely wide latitude before the protection of the NLRA will be forfeited.
Id. at 173-77.
32. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb 19, 1974).
33. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
34. 485 F.2d at 927-28.
35. Id. at 928-30. The court noted that "[t]he law does not give the union an
option to tolerate some racial discrimination, but declares that all racial discrimination
in employment is illegal." Id. at 928 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 929-30. Thus the D. C. Circuit concurred with the trial examiner's
finding regarding the good faith/bad faith issue. 192 N.L.R.B. at 185.
37. 485 F.2d at 930.
38. Id. at 931.
39. Id. (emphasis in original). The court also indicated that on remand the La-
bor Board could determine whether the dissidents' action evidenced such disloyalty to
the Company as to warrant a denial of NLRA protection. Id. See note 271 infra,
regarding this issue.
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Judge Wyzanski issued a strong dissent which is noteworthy for
its ideological appeal. He indicated that the majority opinion had not
provided sufficient protection for minority protesters who were dissat-
isfied with their labor representative's efforts to alleviate the problems
of discrimination. 40  In an opinion which perhaps injudiciously as-
sumed that labor unions composed of white majorities could not fairly
represent the interests of racial minorities, 41 Judge Wyzanski noted
that "it is essentially a denial of justice to allow the white majority
to have the power to preclude the non-whites from dealing directly
with the employer on racial issues, whether or not this is in disparage-
ment of the rights of the union representative.
42
TO LEAVE NON-WHITES AT THE MERCY OF WHITES
IN THE PRESENTATION OF NON-WHITE CLAIMS WHICH
ARE ADMITTEDLY ADVERSE TO THE WHITES WOULD
BE A MOCKERY OF DEMOCRACY. SUPPRESSION, IN-
TENTIONAL OR OTHERWISE, OF THE PRESENTATION
OF NON-WHITE CLAIMS CANNOT BE TOLERATED IN
OUR SOCIETY EVEN IF, WHICH IS PROBABLY AT LEAST
THE SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCE, THE RESULT IS THAT
INDUSTRIAL PEACE IS TEMPORARILY ADVERSELY AF-
FECTED. IN PRESENTING NON-WHITE ISSUES NON-
WHITES CANNOT, AGAINST THEIR WILL, BE RELE-
GATED TO WHITE SPOKESMEN, MIMICKING BLACK MEN.
THE DAY OF THE MINSTREL SHOW IS OVER.
43
General Underlying Policies
National Labor Relations Act
Prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935, 44 there was a significant amount of labor unrest in America,
since most union organizing efforts lacked the protection of federal
law.46  However, with the passage of the NLRA, workers were pro-
40. 485 F.2d at 932-41.
41. Id. at 937-39.
42. Id. at 938-39. Judge Wyzanski clearly believed that constitutional problems
would be encountered if the NLRA were to be interpreted in a manner which could
possibly permit white majority unions in any fashion to thwart the efforts of racial
minorities to achieve employment justice. Id. See text accompanying notes 264-71 in-
fra.
43. 485 F.2d at 940.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), formerly 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
45. See generally P. TAFT, ORGANZED LABOR rN AMEpcAN HIsTORY (1964);
F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1966); A. GrrLow, LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
SocrETY (rev. ed. 1963); S. PERLMAN, HIsToRY OF TRADE UNIONISm IN TIE UNITED
STATES (1922); S. PERLMAN & P. TAFr, HISTORY OF LABOR IN TIE UNrrED STATES,
1896-1932 (1935).
Although the labor protections of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat.
[Vol. 26
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vided with a legal vehicle for insuring the protection of their newly-
created right to organize for mutual benefit.46 The NLRA declared
it to be
"the policy of the United States" to encourage the practice of col-
lective bargaining and full freedom of worker self-organization, as
a means of facilitating the free flow of interstate commerce. Em-
ployees covered by the act were given the "right" to organize and
to bargain collectively and this right was made effective by pro-
scribing as "unfair labor practices," five kinds of employer conduct
vis-a-vis unionism. The principle of "majority rule" among em-
ployees in selecting union representatives was adopted, and a...
National Labor Relations Board was created with authority to
settle representation questions and to prosecute violations of the
unfair labor practice provisions of the act.
47
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act48 amended the NLRA by proscribing
certain unfair labor practices by labor organizations, 49 and in 1959,
the Landrum-Griffin Act 0 provided a few additional refinements.
The NLRA's pervasive code of labor regulations severely limited
the right of unions, employees," and employers to engage in activities
which would be disruptive of commerce. Although resort to tradi-
tional economic action was clearly not prohibited,5 2 particularly during
198 (1933), had preceded the Wagner Act by two years, they were of short-lived dura-
tion, being declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
46. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the constitu-
tionality of the NLRA was sustained.
47. R. Smff, L. MEnaRnmn & T. ST. ANToINE, LABOR R LATIONS LAw 37 (4th
ed. 1968). See also Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142
(1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
The Labor Board was created to provide an administrative agency which would
develop broad expertise in the labor area. See Christensen, The Functioning of the
National Labor Relations Board: A Critique, in N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL CoNFEaNcE
ON LABOR 177, 178 (1963); Note, Racially Discriminatory Union Conduct: Constitu-
tional Commands for the NLRB, 56 IowA L. Rlv. 1044, 1054 (1971). But see Getman
& Goldberg, The Myth of Board Expertise, 39 U. CHL L. REv. 681 (1972).
48. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
49. NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) (union unfair labor practices).
50. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153,
158-60, 164, 186-87, 401-531 (1970).
51. Although the NLRA only proscribes unfair labor practices by "employers"
and "labor organizations," it is well established that individual employees may forfeit
the protection of that Act when they engage in activities detrimental to an existing bar-
gaining relationship or in derogation of their designated representative union. See
notes 153-66 infra, regarding the parameters and ramifications of the exclusivity doc-
trine as it affects individual workers.
52. NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970), expressly provides that, "Nothing in
the collective bargaining process,5 3 Congress expressly indicated its de-
sire to have disputes which arose during the term of a negotiated con-
tract resolved by peaceful, noncoercive means.
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of griev-
ance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.
54
To insure further the stability of employer-employee relations, sec-
tion 9(a) of the NLRA"5 expressly provided that the union designated
by the majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be the "exclusive" representative of all of the workers in that unit with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. This was to prevent the types of intolerable work interruption
which could be precipitated by the unauthorized actions of dissident
minorities."' It is this "exclusivity" principle which the Supreme
Court may have to harmonize with the policies embodied in Title VII
when it decides the Emporium case.
Title VII of the Civil Fights Act of 1964
Prior to and during the period when Congress was establishing
a pervasive legislative scheme for the protection and regulation of the
collective bargaining rights of employees, discrimination in employ-
ment was being openly practiced. 57 In fact, it was not until the enact-
this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as ei-
ther to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect
the limitations or qualifications on that right." See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
53. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960),
wherein the Supreme Court recognized that the utilization of economic weapons by ne-
gotiating parties is "part and parcel" of the collective bargaining process. See also
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967).
54. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1970).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). The text of which is contained in note 152 in-
Ira.
56. See text accompanying notes 167-201 infra, for a detailed explication of the
exclusivity doctrine and its effect upon minority groups.
57. Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 239. For a discussion of the pervasive prac-
tices and effects of racial discrimination prior to the enactment of Title VII in 1964,
see F. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR (1965); P. NORGEN & S. HILL,
TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1964); M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World-
The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 455 (1971).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
September 19741 MINORITY ACTION V. UNION EXCLUSIVITY 13
ment of Title VII in 1964 that Congress meaningfully addressed the
problem.
By 1964, Congress began to recognize the pernicious effect
which employment discrimination has upon American society.58 It
realized "that in a substantial number of instances black workers were
not being dealt with fairly in the collective bargaining process."' 9 The
inclusion of no-discrimination clauses in negotiated agreements were
of little significance, since both white union leaders and company offi-
cials frequently were insensitive to undesirable working conditions af-
fecting black employees and usually did not implement the pro-
visions. 60 The answer of Congress to the unconscionable plight of mi-
nority workers was the enactment of Title VII which boldly embodied
a strong federal policy against employment discrimination.
Title VII has provided workers with comprehensive protection
against discrimination practiced by either employers or labor organiza-
tions based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,1 Nev-
ertheless, it has not granted any exalted status to these "minorities."
58. "Racial discrimination poses a problem so difficult and aggravating as to con-
stitute a major threat to the preservation of American society and its formally stated
ideals .... Elimination of planned and unplanned discrimination in employment is
a crucial step in breaking down the intricate pattern which perpetuates currently prac-
ticed discrimination. Without adequate employment opportunities the victims of racial
discrimination are unable to afford adequate housing, education or training, and the
minority group fails to produce its proportion of the whole society's success models."
Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation
of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REv. 455 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Racial Discrimination
in Employment].
59. Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 239.
60. Black Power, supra note 6, at 48; see Gould, Labor Arbitration of Griev-
vances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 63 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Labor Arbitration].
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000e-1 to -17 (Supp. II 1972). For analyses of the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 see M.
SovWRN, LEGAL REnAIS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966);
Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22
RuTGERs L. REv. 465 (1968); Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 7 B.C. INI. & Com. L. REv. 417 (1966); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598 (1969); Gould, Employment Security, Seniority
amid Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1
(1967); Racial Discrimination in Employment, supra note 58; Rachlin, Title VII:
Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 473 (1966); Rosen, The
Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Rosen]; Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. IND. &
COm. L. REV. 459 (1966); Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Sher-
man]; Note, Title VII, Seniority, Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV.
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII...
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees ....
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee
a job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the
Act does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress
has proscribed.
6 2
The Title VII policy against preferential treatment for any group
will certainly warrant consideration by the Supreme Court when it
evaluates the principles relevant to the Emporium case. The Court
will also have to consider the appropriate weight which should be ac-
corded to section 704(a) of Title VII,63 which prohibits discriminatory
action by an employer or a union based upon the fact that an indi-
vidual "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment prac-
tice by this title." However, prior to our exploration of these impor-
tant questions, it would be beneficial to examine two highly pertinent
areas of concern under the NLRA. First, the manner in which the
Labor Board has historically handled racial discrimination cases, and
second, the evolution and application of the "exclusivity" doctrine
which protects the authority and status of the majority bargaining rep-
resentative.
L Rnv. 1260 (1967); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Racial Discrimination by
Labor Unions, 41 ST. JomN's L. REv. 58 (1966); Comment, The Scope of Judicial Re-
lief Under Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TEXus L. REv. 516 (1968);
Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32
U. Cm. L. REv. 430 (1965); Note, Implementing Governmental Policy Against Racial
Discrimination in Employment: Fair Employment Practice Laws, Title Vii, National
Labor Relations Act, and the Philadelphia Act, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 157, 162-80
(1970); Note, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Discrimination and Union Membership, 27
WAsH. & LE L. REv. 323 (1970). For analyses of the 1972 amendments to Title VII
see Comment, Policy Conflict: Should an Arbitration Award Be Allowed to Bar a Suit
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 84, 116-17 &
nn. 155-57 (1972). For related anti-discrimination legislation see Equal Pay Act § 3,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970), which requires that women receive pay equal to that pro-
vided to men for equivalent work, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4(d),
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970), which prohibits discrimination against persons aged forty
to sixty-five on account of their ages. For a discussion of other methods available to
challenge discriminatory employment practices, see notes 228-44 & accompanying text
infra.
62. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). See generally
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 71 MicH. L. Rnv. 59 (1972).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), as amended, (Supp. 1I, 1972).
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Traditional NLRB Treatment of Discriminatory Practices
by Unions or Employers
The Labor Board possesses the statutory authority both to resolve
questions concerning the desire of employees in an appropriate unit
to be represented by a particular labor organization for collective bar-
gaining purposes and to decide unfair labor practice complaints. While
exercising its responsibilities in these two areas, the NLRB has fre-
quently had the opportunity to consider the ramifications of discrim-
inatory practices under the NLRA, and many of its pronouncements
regarding this issue antedated the enactment of Title VII.
Representation Authority of Labor Board
The general statutory authority of the Labor Board regarding the
determination and regulation of representation questions is defined in
section 9 of the NLRA.6  When a petition is filed with the NLRB
indicating that a number of employees desire to be represented by
a labor organization, the Labor Board must decide several questions.
First, assuming the petition has been accompanied by evidence dem-
onstrating sufficient employee interest in representation,65 the NLRB
must determine whether a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
representation has been designated.66 The Labor Board must there-
after conduct a secret ballot election, and if the election has been un-
tainted by improper campaign tactics, it must certify the results
thereof.0 7 If a majority of the eligible voters have favored representa-
tion, their employer will be obligated to bargain collectively and in
good faith with their designated representative.68 The Labor Board
must finally decide when and under what circumstances the authoriza-
tion of a bargaining representative may be forfeited or revoked.
"Through its powers to conduct and regulate representation elec-
tions, to certify unions as exclusive statutory bargaining representatives
and to compel employers to bargain with unions, the board has ...
weapons that may be used to great advantage against racial discrim-
ination." 69 Although the NLRB has occasionally exercised its author-
ity in this regard, its actions have certainly left much to be desired.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
65. See NLRA §§ 9(c), (e), 29 U.S.C. H§ 159(c), (e) (1970). The petition
must also satisfy the timeliness requirements of the NLRA. Id. § 159() (3).
66. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). See also id. § 159(c)(5).
67. Id. § 159(c).
68. NLRA§§ 8(a)(5), (d),29U.S.C. H 158(a) (5), (d) (1970).
69. Rosen, supra note 61, at 788; see Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VA.N. L. REv.
547, 549, 558-71 (1963) thereinafter cited as Albert]; Boyce, Racial Discrimination
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Since almost the time of its inception, the NLRB has refused to
consider race as a criterion for determining whether a designated unit
would be appropriate for collective bargaining representation."° The
Labor Board thus recognized that unit demarcations based solely upon
racial considerations were improper. Furthermore, the Labor Board
has made it clear that appeals to racial prejudice during an election
campaign will not be countenanced, and the cases have unequivocally
viewed such appeals as appropriate bases for setting aside the results
of elections.
We take it as datum that prejudice based on color is a power-
ful emotional force. We think it also indisputable that a deliber-
ate appeal to such prejudice is not intended or calculated to en-
courage the reasoning faculty.
The Board does not intend to tolerate as "electoral propa-
ganda" appeals or arguments which can have no purpose except
to inflame the racial feelings of voters in the election.7 '
and the National Labor Relations Act, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 232, 234-36 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Boyce]; Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective
Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination?, 24 MD. L. REV. 113, 158-62 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Herring]; Sherman, supra note 61, at 782-85; Sovern, The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 563, 594-604
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Sovern].
70. See, e.g., Andrews Indus. Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 946 (1953); Norfolk So. Bus
Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948); F.S. Royster Guano Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1947);
Foley Lumber & Export Corp., 70 N.L.RB. 73 (1946); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.,
67 N.L.R.B. 100 (1946); Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945); United States
Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382 (1943); Southern Wood Preserving Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 25
(1941); Aetna Iron & Steel Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 136 (1941); Georgia Power Co., 32
N.L.R.B. 692 (1941); Interstate Granite Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 1046 (1939); Union En-
velope Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1147 (1939); American Tobacco Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 597 (1938).
71. Sewel Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71 (1962). See also Albert, supra note
69, at 565-81; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HA.v. L. REV. 38, 67-74 (1964); Fuchs
& Ellis, Title VII: Relationship and Effect on the National Labor Relations Board,
7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 575, 575-84 (1966); Sachs, The Racial Issue as an Anti-
union Tool and the National Labor Relations Board, 14 LAB. L.. 849 (1963); Com-
ment, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representative
Campaigns, 72 YALE L.. 1243 (1963).
The fact that section 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970), provides
that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such ex-
pression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit," has not inhibited
the Labor Board's revulsion to racial campaign appeals, since section 8(c) does not af-
fect the authority of the NLRB to set aside representation elections. See Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950), overruled on other grounds, National Furniture
Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
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This does not mean, however, that racial issues may never be a proper
campaign debate topic.
So long . . . as a party limits itself to truthfully setting forth
another party's position on matters of racial interest and does not
deliberately seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by
irrelevant, inflammatory appeals, we shall not set aside an election
on this ground.
72
Nevertheless, "the burden will be on the party making use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and germane, and where there
is doubt as to whether the total conduct of such party is within the
described bounds, the doubt will be resolved against him.
'73
The NLRB can also refuse to certify an elected labor organization
where it is shown that the union will not represent all minority em-
ployees fairly.74 Despite the fact that this approach might effectively
prevent minority rights from being unfairly sacrificed to majority inter-
ests, "[tihe NRLB has consistently refused to deny certification even
where it has appeared most probable that the winning union would
violate its duty" to represent everyone fairly.
75
In Larus & Brother Co.,7 6 the Labor Board noted that it will re-
voke a union's certification where it has in fact failed fully to repre-
sent the interests of all workers. 77  However, the union's certification
was not actually revoked in Larus, since it had voluntarily relinquished
its certified status prior to the time the Labor Board issued its deci-
sion.78  Although the NLRB strongly re-emphasized its intention to
revoke the certification of discriminating unions in its Pioneer Bus
72. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72 (1962) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 72.
74. See Herring, supra note 69, at 160-61; Sherman, supra note 69, at 784; Sov-
em, supra note 69, at 596-99.
75. Herring, supra note 69, at 161. See Sherman, supra note 61, at 784. But
see Bekins Moving & Storage Co. of Florida, Inc., Case 12-RC-4352, 211 N.L.R.B. No.
7 (June 11, 1974); NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471
(8th Cir. 1973) which indicate that the Labor Board may not use its certification au-
thority to assist a union which engages in invidious discrimination.
76. 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
77. For a discussion of a labor organization's duty of fair representation see text
accompanying notes 111-51 infra.
78. See Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 329 (1953), wherein the Labor
Board reiterated its willingness to revoke the certification of unions which breach their
duty of fair representation. However, in Hughes Tool, the NLRB again refrained from
ordering certification revocation, because it regarded the case as one of "first impres-
sion," involving a joint holder of the certification status which had not breached its
obligation to the employees. Id. at 329. See also A.O. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B.
621 (1957); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
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decision,79 it is disappointing to note that it has never actually revoked
a labor organization's certification due to racial discrimination."0
Over the years, the Labor Board has developed the so-called
"contract bar" doctrine which is intended to protect stable bargaining
relationships. Under this doctrine, once an agreement has been
signed by an employer with an incumbent union, another labor organi-
zation cannot petition to represent the employees covered by that con-
tract until either its expiration or the passage of a reasonable period
of time after its execution-now held to be three years-whichever
is earlier.81 Needless to say, this rule provides incumbent unions with
significant protection. However, should the incumbent labor organi-
zation breach its duty of fair representation during the life an existing
agreement by unfairly discriminating against minority workers, it will
forfeit the protection furnished by the "contract bar" doctrine.8 ' This
weapon may well provide a meaningful incentive for weak unions to
avoid discriminatory practices, but, as is true of all the antidiscrimina-
tion measures utilized by the Labor Board under its section 9 repre-
sentation authority, it does not significantly affect powerful labor or-
ganizations.
83
A labor union does not require NLRB certification as a prere-
quisite to a fruitful collective bargaining relationship. Therefore, so
long as the organization possesses sufficient economic power to induce
an employer voluntarily to recognize and to negotiate with it, a union
may successfully exist without any representation approval from the
Board. Because of this consideration, the NLRB must avail itself of
other methods, if it desires to influence those unions which are prac-
tically immune to its representation authority.
Unfair Labor Practice Authority of Labor Board
Under section 10 of the NLRA84 the Labor Board is empow-
ered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor prac-
tice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce."85  For many years, the
79. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.I.B. 54 (1962).
80. Herring, supra note 69, at 158.
81. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
82. Jno. H. Swisher & Son, 209 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (Feb. 14, 1974); Pioneer Bus
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962); Albert, supra note 69, at 563-65.
83. See Boyce, supra note 69, at 236; Herring, supra note 69, at 162.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
85. Employer unfair labor practices are defined in NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (1970), while those pertaining to labor organizations are delineated in NLRA
§ 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970). Only those provisions which are directly relevant
to the scope of this article will be carefully examined here.
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NLRB has utilized its unfair labor practice authority to proscribe var-
ious acts of discrimination practiced by both employers and unions.
Although a few writers have opposed the Labor Board's endeavors in
this regard, particularly in light of the enactment of Title VIi's perva-
sive antidiscrimination provisions in 1964,8( it is believed that
the NLRB should continue, and even increase, its vigilant efforts to
eradicate employment discrimination.
Title VIE should not be considered to have pre-empted the
NLRA with respect to discriminatory practices which affect rights ex-
pressly protected by the Labor Act. At the time of the enactment
of Title VII, the Justice Department clearly recognized this point.
Nothing in Title VII or anywhere else in [the Civil Rights Act
of 1964] affects rights and obligations under the N.L.R.A.
. . . Of course, Title VII is not intended to and does not deny
to any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under
other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate
both Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National
Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction
. . . . Title VII would have no effect on the duties of an em-
ployer or labor organization under the N.L.R.B. .... 87
It should also be emphasized that not only does the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 contain a general disclaimer of pre-emption of state law, S
but Title VII contains its own disclaimer provisions with respect to
state remedies."9 Furthermore, Senator Tower's proposal to amend
Title VII to provide that its remedial procedures would constitute the
exclusive federal administrative means to challenge alleged employ-
ment discrimination was soundly defeated. 0 It is therefore quite un-
86. See, e.g., Kammholz, Civil Rights Problems in Personnel and Labor Rela-
tions, 53 ILL. BAP. J. 464, 465-66 (1965); Sherman, supra note 61; Note, Labor Law:
Applicability of Unfair Labor Practices to Racial Discrimination Enforcement Under
Civil Rights Act: Independent Metal Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (July 1, 1964),
50 CoRNELL L. REv. 321, 327-30 (1965); Comment, 78 HARv. L. Rnv. 679 (1965);
Note, Unfair Representation As an Unfair Labor Practice, 63 MicH. L. Rnv. 1081,
1089 (1965).
87. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964) (statement prepared for Senator Clark by the
Justice Dep't) (emphasis added).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1970).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970).
90. See 110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964). The proposed amendment would
have provided as follows: "[Title VII] shall constitute the exclusive means whereby
any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch of the Government
or any independent agency of the United States, may grant or seek relief from, or pur-
sue any remedy with respect to, any employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee covered by this title, if such employment practice may be
the subject of a charge or complaint filed under this title." A similar amendment was
rejected in connection with the 1972 E.E.O. Act. See H.R. 9247, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
derstandable why the courts have thus far recognized the continuing
unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Labor Board in cases involving
racial discrimination.9 This judicial trend will most likely persist,
thus permitting the NLRB to sustain its efforts to protect employees
covered by the NLRA from the discriminatory practices of both em-
ployers and unions.
Discrimination and Employer Action
It is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 of the N.L.R.A."' 2 The Labor Board has traditionally ap-
plied this provision -to improper employer appeals to racial prejudice.
While such appeals generally arose during a representation campaign
and frequently provided the basis for an order setting aside the elec-
tion, 93 they have also been found to constitute unfair labor practices.
In Planters Manufacturing Co.,94 the Labor Board concluded that
employer attempts to incite racial prejudice among the workers for the
purpose of causing some to terminate their union membership violated
section 8(a)(1). 95 Similar violations were found where employers
stated: (1) that a particular union would not be friendly to blacks;90
(2) that blacks would not be treated as well by the campaigning union
as by management; 97 (3 that "if the CIO got in the plant, it would
be fulla negroes";98 and (4) that if the plant were organized, it would
91. See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133-34 n.11
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). See also
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BRoox-
LYN L. REv. 62, 94-96 (1964); Fuchs & Ellis, supra note 71, at 597-99; Hickey, Gov-
ernment Regulation of Union Racial Policies, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 191, 230
(1966); Leiken, The Current and Potential Equal Employment Role of the NLRB,
1971 DUKE L.J. 833; Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 GEO.
WAsH. L. REV. 846, 886-89 (1966).
92. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). The text of NLRA § 7,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), is set forth in note 22 supra.
93. See notes 71-73 & accompanying text supra.
94. 10 N.L.R.B. 735 (1938), enforced, 105 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1939).
95. The language construed by the Board is now contained in NLRA § 8(a) (1),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
96. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 259 (1939), enforced as modified on other
grounds, 118 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1941).
97. California Cotton Oil Corp., 20 N.L.R.B. 540 (1940).
98. S.K. Wellman Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 214, 222 (1943).
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be run by blacks and Mexicans.9" When section 8(c), which provides
employers with broad free speech rights so long as no threats of reprisal
or promises of benefit are included, 100 was added to the NLRA in
1947, it appeared that the Labor Board might significantly alter its
unfair labor practice approach to racial appeal cases. It has not, how-
ever, really done so.101
Other practices by employers regarding racial issues may also be
violative of the NLRA. In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co. 10 2 the Supreme Court expressly indicated that peaceful concerted
activities by racial minorities for the purpose of encouraging a com-
pany to employ more minority workers constituted legitimate con-
duct.10 3  This means that an employer may not generally interfere
with concerted activities by employees which are aimed at achieving
racial equality. 10 4  Furthermore, it is even quite possible that employ-
99. Reeves Rubber, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 366 (1945), enforced, 153 F.2d 340 (9th
Cir. 1946).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). The text is set forth in note 71 supra.
101. See, e.g., Robert Meyer Hotel Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 521 (1965), enforced as
modified, 387 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1967) (threat to replace black employees with white
workers); Atkins Saw Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 949 (1964) (threat that
white employees would have to associate with blacks); Boyce Mach. Corp., 141
N.L.R.B. 756 (1963) (statement that union would replace blacks if it won election);
Associated Grocers, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961) (advertising for white replacements
during black organizing campaign); Empire Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1968), en-
forced, 260 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1958) (claim that union would hire blacks). But see
Model Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1527 (1953), enforced, 210 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1954);
Happ Bros., 90 N.L.R.B. 1513 (1950), enforcement denied on other grounds, 196 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1952); American Thread Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949), enforced, 188
F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1951). See generally Albert, supra note 69, at 581-86.
102. 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
103. The New Negro Alliance Court recognized that "tt]he desire for fair and
equitable conditions of employment on the part of persons of any race, color, or pur-
suasion, and the removal of discriminations against them by reason of their race or
religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and equity in terms
and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft unions or any form of labor
organization or association." Id. at 561.
104. See, e.g., No. 18, Washington State Serv. Employees, 188 N.L.R.B. 957
(1971); Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969), enforcement de-
nied on other grounds, 449 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066
(1972). See also Advance Carbon Prods., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 81 L.R.R.M.
1418 (1972), enforced, 489 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1974). Of course, if an individual em-
ployee acts solely for his own personal benefit and not in concert with any other em-
ployees, he is not protected by the NLRA. See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc., 196
N.L.R.B. 1006 (1972); Maietta Trcking Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 794 (1971). Where em-
ployees in guestion are represented by a labor organization, their right to engage in
their own independent activity will usually be severely restricted. See text accompany-
ing notes 153-201 infra, regarding the obligation of employees to refrain from taking
action which would improperly derogate from the exclusive bargaining authority of
their designated union representative.
ment discrimination per se will be found to be in violation of the
NLRA.
In United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB,1°5 the D. C. Circuit
concluded that "an employer's policy and practice of invidious discrim-
ination on account of race or national origin is a violation of Section
8(a)(1)." I °6  The Court recognized that in order to be in violation
of section 8(a)(1), unjustified employment discrimination must be
found to interfere with or to restrict employees' rights of concerted
action guaranteed under section 7 of the act. 0 7 The D. C. Circuit
concluded that employment discrimination based on race or national
origin has such an impact.'
08
This effect is twofold: (1) racial discrimination sets up an un-
justified clash of interests between groups of workers which tends
to reduce the likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in
concert to achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and (2)
racial discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility
which inhibits them from asserting their rights against the perpe-
trator of the discrimination. We find that the confluence of these
two factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7 rights as
to violate Section 8(a)(1).09
Although it is unclear what acts of employment discrimination by an
employer will be covered by the United Packinghouse Workers' ra-
tionale, 110 it is nevertheless important to recognize that NLRA protec-
tion may be available to minority workers against employer discrimina-
tion.
Union Duty of Fair Representation
Pursuant to the requirement of section 9(a) of the NLRA,"' l
once a labor organization is selected as the bargaining agent by a ma-
105. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
106. Id. at 1138.
107. Id. at 1135.
108, Id.
109. Id. (emphasis in original); see Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443
F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1971).
110. See Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973), where
the Labor Board clearly indicated that it does not consider employment discrimination
by an employer to constitute a per se violation of the NLRA, since "discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, standing alone ... is not 'inher-
ently destructive' of employees' Section 7 rights .... ." 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484. Al-
though it recognized that some acts of discrimin'tion by an employer could violate the
Act, it refused to accept wholly the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit's United Packing-
house Workers decision. Id.; cf. Pacific Maritime As'p 9'19 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 85
L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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jority of employees, it is obligated to represent all of the workers in
that unit, not just those who have supported it." 2 While this doctrine
provides the union agent with what may be significant support, it also
has the affect of imposing a representative upon the minority group
of workers who do not necessarily desire such representation. Rec-
ognizing that a labor organization could utilize its statutory authority
to retaliate against either those who opposed its selection or other un-
favored groups, both the courts and the Labor Board had developed




In the landmark case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co.,"14 the Supreme Court held that the exclusivity principle, through
which the Railway Labor Act" provides a designated bargaining
agent with the authority to represent all of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit, imposes a correlative duty which requires the union to
represent all of the unit employees fairly. The Court recognized that
once a majority representative has been selected,
[T]he minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute
of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a rep-
resentative of their own, and its members cannot bargain individ-
ually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the
subject of collective bargaining."16
The Court analogized the power of the representative to that of a leg-
islature which is subject to constitutional limits designed to insure the
equal protection of the rights of its constituency and noted further that
112. See text accompanying notes 153-201 infra, for an explication of the develop-
ment and ramifications of the exclusivity doctrine.
113. See generally Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Repreenta.
tion, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion from
Union Activities, 22 OHIo ST. LJ. 21 (1961); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation,
2 ViLL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Herring, supra note 69; Rosen, Fair Representation, Con-
tract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in
Collective Bargaining, 15 HAsNGs L.J. 391 (1964); Wellington, Union Democracy
and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE LJ.
1327 (1958).
114. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
115. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970), formerly, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 48
Stat. 1185 (1934); 49 Stat. 1189 (1936); 54 Stat. 785, 786 (1940); 64 Stat. 1238
(1951); 78 Stat. 748 (1964); 80 Stat. 208 (1966). A labor organization selected pur-
suant to the Railway Labor Act is provided with the same authority to represent all
of the workers in the unit as is a union under the protection of section 9(a) of the
NLRA.
116. 323 U.S. at 200.
the absence of comparable safeguards with respect to federally sanc-
tioned labor organizations could present constitutional problems.".7
In an obvious effort to avoid the constitutional question, the Court
extracted from the general Railway Labor Act provisions a congres-
sional intent to impose upon the statutory representative a duty as ex-
acting as that which the Constitution imposes upon a legislature, to
protect equally the interests of those whom it represents. 118 The se-
lected labor organization was thus held duty-bound "to exercise fairly
the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
Nithout hostile discrimination against them."" 9 Although rational dis-
tinctions between various groups of employees based upon relevant
considerations were not prohibited, the Steele Court expressly noted
that this discretion "does not include the authority to make . . .dis-
criminations not based on such relevant differences.' 20  More sig-
nificant for purposes of this article, the Court, which was considering
a case involving union discrimination against racial minorities, ex-
pressly ruled that "discriminations based on race alone are obviously
irrelevant and invidious.''1 1
At the time of its Steele decision, the Court decided a companion
case122 wherein it stated that:
The duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of
the [NLRA] extend beyond the mere representation of the inter-
ests of its own group members. By its selection as bargaining rep-
resentative, it has become the agent of all the employees, charged
with the responsibility of representing their interests fairly and im-
partially.123
It is thus clear that both Railway Labor Act and NLRA unions are
subject to the judicially recognized duty of fair representation.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 2 the Supreme Court observed
that while the duty of fair representation imposes some restrictions
upon a bargaining agent's representative authority, that doctrine should
117. Id. at 198.
118. Id. at 202.
119. Id. at 203.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added); see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U.S. 768, 774 (1952), wherein the Court noted that the Railway Labor Act "thus pro-
hibits bargaining agents it authorizes from using their position and power to destroy
colored workers' jobs in order to bestow them on white workers." See also Tunstal
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
122. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). See also Syres v. Oil
Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
123. 323 U.S. at 255.
124. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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not be utilized to limit unfairly a union's negotiating discretion. The
Court noted that a negotiated agreement will inevitably affect various
employees differently and that the satisfaction of all employees, there-
fore, could not be expected. 125 Huffman thus concluded:
A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bar-
gaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject al-
ways to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise
of its discretion.
2 6
The doctrine of fair represenation does not apply merely during
the actual negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. It is
equally applicable during the administration and interpretation of that
contract.
Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other
things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other
working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing
agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured
by contract. The bargaining representative can no more unfairly
discriminate in carrying out these functions than it can in negotiat-
ing a collective agreement. 27
If an employee believes that his employer is not properly follow-
ing the terms of a bargaining contract, he may, in the absence of a
binding arbitration provision, bring suit under section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act 2 " to enforce his alleged rights.129  Should the agreement
contain a binding grievance-arbitration procedure for the resolution of
contractual disputes, the employee will, as a prerequisite to his right
to commence a section 301 action, first be required to exhaust the
grievance machinery."30 This requirement will be excused, however,
125. Id. at 338.
126. Id. See note 131 infra.
127. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
190 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964). Although the Supreme Court
has appeared not to impose a stricter standard upon a union when it is merely adminis-
tering an agreement rather than actually negotiating it, such an approach has been sug-
gested. See Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 6 Mic-I. L. Rv. 1435 (1963).
See also Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73
YALE LJ. 1215 (1964).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
129. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Where such actions are
brought before state tribunals, federal substantive law applies. See Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
130. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). This requirement is
premised upon the strong federal policy which favors arbitration as the proper method
for resolving contractual disputes. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
when an employee contends that such an exercise would be fruitless
due to the fact that his union representative is not fairly and ade-
quately representing his interests.181
Although the judicial remedy initially provided by the Steele deci-
sion has been sought by hundreds of plaintiffs since 1944,112 the relief
actually afforded has frequently left much to be desired.' 3  One rea-
son suggested for the paucity of satisfactory relief is the liberal discre-
tion permitted to labor organizations. 3 4 Another weakness has been
the cost of the judicial litigation process. 3 ' However, through its de-
velopment of the theory that a breach of the fair representation doc-
trine may constitute an unfair labor practice, the Labor Board has
helped to neutralize -this latter factor."3 6
Labor Board Protection
Although the Steele decision established the judicially-cognizable
fair representation doctrine in 1944, it took eighteen years before the
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See also Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agree-
ments by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv. 883 (1962); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Ar-
bitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Cmi. L. REV. 883 (1962); Smith & Jones,
The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63
MicH. L. REv. 751 (1965).
131. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). It should be noted that the Vaca decision expressly
indicated that an- individual employee does not have the absolute right to have his
grievance processed to arbitration. Id. at 191. The Court would clearly not imply a
breach of a union's duty of fair representation merely because it decided not to proceed
to arbitration, since "[a] breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only
when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190; see id. at 192-93.
132. See Herring, supra note 69, at 115. But see Sovern, Race Discriminaton and
the National Labor Relations Act. The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16ut
CONF. ON LABoR 3, 5 (1963).
133. "In the twenty years since the Steele decision, Negro plaintiffs have claimed
upwards of $6,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. They have actually col-
lected $2,802 of the former and $3,000 of the latter." Herring, supra note 69, at 144.
134. "Construed with such latitude the duty of fair representation has provided
scant protection. The courts have applied a presumption of reasonableness which has
virtually precluded a finding of breach." Comment, Federal Protection of Individual
Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1234 (1964); see Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67
YALE L.J. 1327, 1341 nn. 73 & 76 (1958).
135. See Albert, supra note 69, at 557-58; Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract
Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collec-
tive Bargaining, 15 HAsTiNGS L. 391, 399 (1964). See generally Herring, supra note
69, at 146-47.
136. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-88 (1967), the Supreme Court recognized
that both the NLRB and the courts could exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the fair
representation area, thus precluding any preemption difficulties.
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NLRB completely recognized that it possessed the statutory authority
to utilize its unfair labor practice power to restrict racial discrimination
and other similarly invidious practices by labor organizations. 13' In
1952, the NLRB general counsel indicated that he could discern
nothing in the NLRA which made it an unfair labor practice for a
union to bargain in an unfairly discriminatory manner. 3 " In 1954 and
again in 1956, the general counsel refused to issue unfair labor prac-
tice complaints where racial discrimination was allegedly either toler-
ated or supported by unions. 3 9 In 1958, however, the Labor Board
affirmed, without meaningful comment, a decision of a trial examiner
which strongly indicated, in dicta, that a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation might constitute an unfair labor practice. 40 Finally,
in 1962, the Labor Board completely and expressly embraced this
theory.
In its Miranda Fuel Co. decision,14  a non-race case, the Board
traced the historical development of the judicially-recognized fair rep-
resentation doctrine and concluded "that Section 7 . . . gives em-
ployees the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treat-
ment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their em-
ployment."'142 It therefore determined that such opprobrious conduct
by a labor organization violated section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA.'
43
Although the Second Circuit refused to enforce the Miranda Fuel de-
cision, only one of three judges actually rejected the Labor Board's
statutory analysis. 144
137. See Herring, supra note 69, at 153-54.
138. See Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953).
139. Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956); Case No. 1047, 35 L.R.R.M.
1130 (1954).
140. Textile Workers Local 229, 120 N.L.R.B. 1700 (1958).
141. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 336 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963).
142. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970), which provides: "(b) It shall be an un-
fair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]: Provided, that this
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ... " See NLRA
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), set out in note 22 supra.
The NLRB also found a section 8(b)(2) violation by the union in its Miranda
Fuel decision, since it concluded that a labor organization's attempt to cause an em-
ployer to derogate the employment status of an employee foreseeably had the effect
of encouraging or discouraging union membership. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)
(1970). See also NLRA § (8)(a)(3),29U.S.C.§ 158(a)(3) (1970).
144. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Judge Medina,
In Independent Metal Workers, Local 1,111 the NLRB expanded
upon its Miranda Fuel reasoning. The Board held that a labor organi-
zation which refused, for racially discriminatory reasons, to process the
grievance of an employee breached its duty of fair representation and
thereby committed an unfair labor practice. 14 6 Independent Metal
Workers, Local 1 was almost immediately followed by similar holdings
in Local 1367, International Longshoremen's Association'4 7 and Local
12, United Rubber Workers,148 which were affirmed on appeal. It
thus, appeared that the Labor Board's use of its unfair labor practice
authority to enforce a union's duty of fair representation-vis-a-vis
racial minorities-was firmly established.
In addition to the board's direct authority to declare union dis-
crimination to be violative of the NLRA, the NLRB's unfair labor
practice power may be employed indirectly to thwart invidious discrim-
ination by labor organizations. In NLRB v. Mansion House Center
Management Corp.,14 9 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the NLRB may
not constitutionally order an employer to bargain with a certified bar-
gaining representative which racially discriminates against those em-
ployees it purports to represent.150  If the reasoning of the circuit
alone, believed that the Labor Board's per se approach to the statutory issue was incor-
rect and that an unfair labor practice could be found only where "discrimination was
deliberately designed to encourage membership in the union." Id. at 180. Judge Lum-
bard, concurring in the denial of enforcement of the Board's order, found that there
was insufficient evidence to support the Board's factual conclusions. He therefore con-
cluded that there was no reason for the court to have considered the statutory ques-
tion. Id. Judge Friendly, in dissent, supported the Labor Board's conclusions with re-
spect to sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3); however, he expressly refrained from consider-
ation of the Labor Board's interpretation of section 8(b)(1). Id. at 180-86, 181 n.1.
145. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
146. The Labor Board found the same types of section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2)
violations as it had in Miranda Fuel. However, since it concluded that by improperly
refusing to process the employee's grievance the union effectively breached its obliga-
tion to negotiate fairly for that worker, the Board also found a section 8(b)(3) viola-
tion. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970), which requires a labor organization to bar-
gain in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. See also NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The Board's reasoning
would clearly indicate that union inaction for racial reasons can be just as violative
of the NLRB as direct action. See Boyce, supra note 69, at 239.
147. 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
148. 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1060 (1968). See also NLRB
v. Local 1581, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974); Teamsters,
Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
149. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). See Comment, 7 GA. L. REv. 770 (1973).
150. Although the Eighth Circuit's holding directly concerned its refusal to en-
force a bargaining order of the NLRB issued against an employer which refused to ne-
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court is accepted by the Labor Board and other tribunals, it may pro-
vide a significant weapon which can be utilized against discriminating
unions.
151
The "Exclusivity" Doctrine Under Section 9(a)
of the NLRA 5 2
Individual Rights and Union Exclusivity
In Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway
Employees, 53 the Supreme Court examined the exclusivity provision of
the Railway Labor Act which is analogous to section 9(a) of
the NLRA. The Court ruled that the principle requiring an employer
to negotiate with the majority representative as the exclusive agent of
his employees also imposes the negative duty to refrain from bargain-
ing with any other party. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB 54 ex-
tended this doctrine to employers covered by the NLRA, as it denied
gotiate with an allegedly discriminating labor organization, it is important to note that
the court's broad language could have far-reaching consequences. It certainly implied
that the Labor Board may not consitutionally utilize any of its remedial or certification
procedures to assist a union which invidiously discriminates against those it is required
to represent. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
151. See also Jones, Disestablishment of Labor Unions for Engaging in Racial
Discrimination-A New Use for an Old Remedy, 1972 WIs. L. REv. 351, wherein the
author suggests that the NLRB order the disestablishment of discriminating labor or-
ganizations, just as it traditionally issued such orders against unions which were fla-
grantly dominated by employers. See NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(1970) (proscription against employer support or domination of unions).
152. The exclusivity doctrine has been derived from the language of section 9(a)
of the NLRA: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates or pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment: Provided, that any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract
or agreement then in effect: Provided further, that the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970)
(emphasis added). It should be noted that the exclusivity rights provided to a labor or-
ganization by section 9(a) are applicable whether it has been certified through the
NLRB's election process or has merely been voluntarily recognized by an employer
based upon a demonstration of majority employee support. See generally Hanslowe, Indi-
vidual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Summers, In-
dividual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Summers].
153. 300 U.S. 515, 548-49 (1937); see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944).
154. 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
them the right to bargain directly with their own employees where
an exclusive negotiating representative had already been selected. In
Medo Photo, the Court reasoned that direct bargaining between an
employer and a minority or majority of the employees, in circumven-
tion of the designated bargaining agent, would subvert the statutory
right to collective bargaining guaranteed to al employees.i15 Further-
more, the Court indicated that the employer could not ignore its statu-
tory obligations "even though the employees consent.' 5 6
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the exclusivity doc-
trine may in some cases adversely restrict the rights of individual em-
ployees, but it has recognized that furtherance of the federal labor
policy favoring collective bargaining necessitates such a result.
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position
more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but
the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain,
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as
a contribution to the collective result. We cannot except individ-
ual contracts generally from the operation of collective ones be-
cause some may be more individually advantageous. Individual
contracts cannot subtract from collective ones. .... . 7
H-owever, the fact that individual rights are generally subordinate to
the will of the majority does not mean that individual employees are
helpless. The fair representation doctrine, 58 which was developed to
protect employees from the tyranny of unfair majorities, "has stood
as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
155. Id. at 684; see S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Szss. 13 (1935), wherein
it was stated that the majority rule concept of the NLRA clearly implies "that employ-
ers shall not interfere with the practical application of the right of employees to bar-
gain collectively through chosen representatives by bargaining with individuals or mi-
nority groups in their own behalf, after representatives have been picked by the ma-
jority to represent all ......
156. 321 U.S. at 687. Such direct negotiations by an employer with his own em-
ployees in disregard of the rights of the majority representative constitute a violation
of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA which defines the duty of the employer to bargain
in good faith with the designated agent. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1970).
157. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944). "National labor policy
has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appro-
priate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages,
hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual em-
ployee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested
in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). See also Dunau, Employee Participa-
tion in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 731, 735
(1950) [hereinafter cited Dunau].
158. See text accompanying notes 111-56 supra.
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stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal
labor law."'159 Moreover, the proviso to section 9(a), which permits
individual employees or groups of employees to adjust grievances with
their employer directly, provides workers with some additional protec-
tion.
"[A] collective bargaining representative's control over individ-
ual employees does not end with the consummation of the bargaining
agreement, but continues thereafter through its power to process griev-
ances . ... 1'0 Nevertheless, since the enactment of the Wagner Act
in 1935, Congress has provided individual employees and groups of
employees with certain grievance-adjusting authority of their own.
The original proviso to section 9(a) stated only that "any individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer."' 1  However, in 1947, the Taft-
Harley Act' 62 amended the proviso to section 9(a) of the NLRA, by
adding the following words:
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of
the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not in-
consistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given the opportunity to be present at
such adjustment.
This modification clearly restricted the right of employees to resolve
grievances on their own. No adjustment may conflict with the terms
of an existing agreement.163  In addition, the right provided to indi-
viduals only concerns the adjustment of "grievances," and nothing fur-
ther.
A grievance in labor relations parlance is commonly defined as
any complaint, real or imaginary, which causes a worker to be dis-
159. Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
160. Note, Racial Discrimination and the NLRB: The Hughes Tool Case, 50 VA.
L. Rnv. 1221, 1224 (1964). NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), defines the
duty to bargain collective as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative . . . to ... confer in good faith vith respect to
[among other things] any question arising [under a collective bargaining agreement]."
See Dunau, supra note 157, at 746; see also United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
161. NLRA § 9(a), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). See Hughes Tool Co.
v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
162. Labor-Management Relations Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
163. If an employer were to agree with an individual employee to something
which contravened the terms of the collectively bargained contract, he would be guilty
of an unfair labor practice. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944);
see J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). Furthermore, in Hotel Employers'
Ass'n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966), the arbitrator refused to enforce an individually nego-
tiated "agreement" which conflicted with the bargained contract.
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satisfied with any incident of his job, but in its legal sense, a griev-
ance may in general be confined to (1) a claim founded upon
a collective agreement, (2) a claim resting upon a job right exist-
ing independently of a collective agreement, and (3) a minimum
fob irritant capable of correction without essentially affecting the
status quo. Any complaint calling for the formation or change of
employment terms is excluded from the ken of a grievance.164
Therefore, individual efforts aimed at restructuring the employment
relationship for many employees is clearly not protected by the lan-
guage of the proviso. 165 It should finally be noted -that while "an inex-
perienced or ignorant griever can ask a more experienced friend to as-
sist him . . . he cannot present his grievance through any union ex-
cept the representative." 166
Although the proviso to section 9(a) may provide many em-
ployees with a meaningful right, it will not usually be of significant
benefit to minority workers who are endeavoring to achieve what they
consider to be racial justice in employment. Most of their efforts will
necessarily be directed at encouraging their employer to modify gen-
erally the working conditions of most, if not all, of the employees in
the bargaining unit, and it is quite obvious that such actions would
clearly transcend the scope of "grievance"-adjusting protection af-
forded by the proviso. These workers must therefore seek NLRA
protection through some other statutory provision or risk the possibility
that their actions will be wholly unprotected.
164. Dunau, supra note 157, at 736 (emphasis added); see West Texas Util. Co.
v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442, 446-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953);
Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1945). See also Elgin, Jol-
iet, & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 724 (1945); Summers, supra note 152, at 377;
Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE LJ.
559, 562 (1968).
165. See Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73
YALE L.J. 1215, 1218 (1964). The reason for the distinction between "grievances" and
"collective bargaining" is quite apparent. "When all that is at stake is a personal griev-
ance of an individual employee, the threat to industrial peace is not comparable to its
counterpart during the negotiation of the collective agreement." Note, Individual Con-
trol Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.. 559, 564 (1968).
166. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1945); see NLRB v.
Lundy Mfg. Corp., 316 F.2d 921, 925 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
In light of the fact that section 2(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970), very
broadly defines the term "labor organization" to include "any organization of any kind
... in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes ... or conditions
of work," it should be apparent that many groups which are not normally regarded as
being "labor organizations" would thus be prohibited from directly assisting minority
workers with their individual efforts to adjust grievances with their employer. See
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959), regarding the extremely broad scope
of the section 2(5) definition.
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Minority Action Versus Union Exclusivity
Peaceful concerted activity by employees aimed at achieving ra-
cial equality1 67 or other conditions of employment is generally pro-
tected.168 However, when such action has the effect of derogating
from the exclusive authority of a designated bargaining representa-
tive, it may lose the protection of the Labor Aot.8 9  To understand
the often hypertechnical and ephemeral distinctions and demarcations
which have been drawn regarding this difficult area, one must chron-
ologically trace the evolution of leading cases dealing with the subject.
In -the International Envelope 70 case, the Labor Board consid-
ered a situation involving employees17' )covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement who briefly left their work stations to talk with their
employer in an effort, independent of their union, to induce him to
change their remuneration basis from an hourly rate to a salary-type
system. As a result, the workers were terminated, and the board up-
held the employer's action.
[The] contract provided orderly methods for settling grievances
and other disputes through duly designated representatives of the
employees. The three discharged men took it upon themselves to
make a demand upon the employer. . . which would change the
terms of the existing contract . . . .The Union was not only the
statutory representative of the discharged employees by virtue of
Section 9(a) of the Act, but they had themselves designated it
as their representative by becoming members. When the Union
was unable to effectuate their desires, the discharged employees
decided to take matters into their own hands. The Union, as the
authorized representative of all the employees disapproved of the
action of the minority group . . . . Under such circumstances,
when a dissident minority group takes action contrary to the terms
of an existing contract and contrary to the wishes of the duly desig-
nated representative . . . disciplinary action by the employer...
is clearly justified. To rule otherwise would be to permit self-
appointed dissenting groups within a union to ignore or to defy
the legally designated representative, to take matters into their
167. See notes 102-04 & accompanying test supra.
168. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), set out in note 22 supra.
169. See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J.
319 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Cox]; Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure
by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1195 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Getman]; Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat"
Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967);
Lieken, supra note 91.
170. International Envelope Corp., 34 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1941).
171. The workers involved were apparently "supervisory" personnel, but until
NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970), was amended in 1947 to exclude expressly
"supervisors" from the statutory definition of the term "employee," such workers were
covered by the act's provisions.
own hands, to destroy the collective agreements negotiated by the
majority organizations, and to undermine the process of collective
bargaining itself.
17 2
Subsequent appellate court decisions, dealing with relatively similar
conduct in contravention of the position of a bargaining representative,
have generally accepted the fundamental rationale of the International
Envelope decision.
In the Draper'73 case, the Fourth Circuit ruled on the use of un-
authorized concerted action in support of the labor organization's bar-
gaining position. During new contract negotiations, the employer con-
tinuously utilized what appeared to be dilatory tactics. Finally, an ex-
asperated group of employees, without the knowledge of their union,
engaged in a peaceful work-stoppage to force their employer to bar-
gain. Their subsequent discharges were sustained by the court, which
concluded that such unauthorized "wildcat" strikes contravened the
major purpose underlying the enactment of the NLRA, namely, the
prevention of unnecessary interference with the free flow of com-
merce. 1'7 1 Such action was also found to be in violation of the exclu-
sivity principle.
Minority groups must acquiesce in the action of the majority and
the bargaining agent they have chosen; and, just as a minority has
no right to enter into separate bargaining arrangements with the
employer, so it has no right to take independent action to interfere
with the course of bargaining which is being carried on by the duly
authorized bargaining agent chosen by the majority.175
Thus, even where the peaceful, but unauthorized, activity is intended
to support and strengthen the bargaining posture of the union repre-
sentative it has been found to be unprotected. Other circuits have
concluded similarly that individual employee freedom is pre-empted
by the need for procedural stability.'7 6
The basic Draper rationale was followed by the Seventh Circuit
in the Harnischfeger case' 7 which involved one important distinguish-
ing feature. There the unprotected "wildcat" strike was not suppor-
172. 34 N.L.R.B. at 1282-83 (emphasis added).
173. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
174. Id. at 203; see NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
175. 145 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
176. See Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1954), each following the basic rationale of Draper. It is important to note that even
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Congress expressly approved of the Fourth Circuit's Draper
holding. See H.R. RE'. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947).
177. Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
September 19741 MINORITY ACTION V. UNION EXCLUSIVITY 35
five of the union's bargaining position, but rather was intended to alter
the labor organization's approach. The court had no difficulty in de-
ciding that the dissident employees' direct interference with the bar-
gaining position of their selected representative was not protected by
the NLRA.
The Plasti-Line17 case concerned employees who engaged in un-
authorized concerted activity during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement to indicate their displeasure with the manner in which their
union was processing a particular grievance. The court, noting that the
dissenting group struck in "direct defiance of the purpose of the Act
under which they [sought] redress,"'179 utilized the Draper reasoning
to uphold their terminations. Further, the court expressly ruled that
the proviso to section 9(a) of the act did not afford protection to such
disruptive action, since such an approach "would be to hold that a mi-
nority group may lawfully strike whenever a grievance is decided in
a manner which does not satisfy such minority group."8 0 Notwithstand-
ing this line of authority, some unauthorized concerted activities have
been accorded NLRA protection.
Western Contracting Corp. v. NLRB' 8 1 provided the Tenth Cir-
cuit with a factual situation somewhat analogous to that in the Draper
case, but the court reached the opposite conclusion. The workers en-
gaged in a spontaneous work stoppage to protest the lack of heaters
in the employer's trucks. Although their union had not authorized
the action, it was in full sympathy with such activity, since it had itself
previously endeavored to obtain heaters for the vehicles. Further-
more, unlike the Draper situation, a majority of the employees ap-
proved of and participated in the strike." 2  The Tenth Circuit relied
upon this majority support and the fact that the union had not actually
been negotiating ,the heater issue at the time of the work stoppage
to distinguish the Draper holding. It approvingly quoted the reason-
ing utilized by the Labor Board to afford the workers section 7 protec-
tion.
If the position taken by the employees is contrary to that of their
bargaining representative, the bargaining process itself may there-
178. Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960).
179. Id. at 485.
180. Id. at 487.
181. 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
182. The applicable collective bargaining agreement did not contain a no-strike
provision. Id. at 896. Needless to say, work stoppages in breach of negotiated con-
tracts are not protected. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71
(1953); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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by be impaired or destroyed . . . . But a position taken by the
employees in support of that of their bargaining representative
creates no such threat. The demand of the employees in this case
and of the Union which represented them was one and the same.
The employees were entitled to engage in concerted action so long
as such action was not in violation of their contract or in deroga-
tion of the position taken by their bargaining agent. The action
here was clearly in support of rather than in derogation of the
union's position.
18 3
The factual circumstances in the R. C. Can'8 4 case were virtually
identical to those in Draper, yet statutory protection was again pro-
vided to the dissonant group. Some of the workers were not satisfied
with the progress of the negotiations taking place between the union
and their employer, and eight out of approximately fifty unit employees
engaged in a brief, but unauthorized' 8 5 work stoppage intended to
force their employer to bargain more meaningfullly with their union.
The Fifth Circuit perceived a basic antagonism between the em-
ployer's need to deal with a single spokesman for the employees and
the ideally democratic character of a union.'8 6 The court nevertheless
believed that there was a workable test for the balancing of these com-
peting policies:
In these conflicting policies, there may be found a basis for reso-
lution: is the action of the individuals or a small group in criti-
cism of, or opposition to, the policies and actions theretofore taken
by the organization? Or, to the contrary, is it more nearly in sup-
port of the things which the union is trying to accomplish? If it
is the former, then such devisive, dissident action is not protected.
[citing Draper, Harnischfeger, and Plasti-Line] . . . If, on the
other hand, it seeks to generate support for and an acceptance of
the demands put forth by the union, it is protected so long, of
course, as the means used do not involve a disagreement with,
repudiation or criticism of, a policy or decision previously taken
by the union. Such as, for example, a no strike pledge, a cool-
ing off period, or the like during negotiation. [citing Western Con-
tracting]18 7
183. 322 F.2d at 896-97, 899. It is important to remember that the type of issue
involved in the Western Contracting case did not really lend itself to resolution through
contractual grievance machinery. Thus the employees who engaged in the work stop-
page were not endeavoring to circumvent any provision of their agreement.
184. NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964).
185. The union had informally decided not to strike at that time. However, while
a representative of the labor organization informed the strikers that he wished that they
had not walked out, he still indicated to them his belief that their action was "pro-
tected." Id. at 977.
186. Id. at 978-79.
187. Id. at 979 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 26
September 1974] MINORITY ACTION V. UNION EXCLUSIVITY 37
The court concluded that the employer "was not put in the position
of choosing between the demands of the Union and the demands of
[the] strikers" due to the fact that the strikers wholly supported their
labor organization's position. 8  It therefore found that their action
warranted NLRA protection.
In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 89 the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the fate of black employees who had engaged in unauthorized
concerted activity aimed at altering their employer's allegedly discrim-
inatory employment policies. Although the dissident workers had ap-
parently not attempted to act through their bargaining representative
before engaging in their concerted action, the Labor Board had de-
cided to afford them statutory protection. The Board had concluded
that by endeavoring to alleviate "what they deemed to be a morally
unconscionable, if not an unlawful, condition of employment," the
black employees had not acted in derogation of their bargaining
agent.
1 0
The Ninth Circuit observed that although the employees' picket-
ing had been "in support of a highly desirable objective. . . this fact
should not be permitted, per se, to obscure the question."'-') It also
noted the NLRB's presumption that the dissident employee action was
in support of the union's substantive position which was derived from
the fact that the union's statutory duty of fair representation would
not permit it to tolerate racial discrimination.' 92 Nonetheless, the
court found the unauthorized activity to be unprotected on the ground
that the minority group's failure initially to attempt to resolve the mat-
ter through the designated bargaining representative violated the ex-
clusivity principle of the Labor Act. 93
In NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 94 the Fifth Circuit reconsid-
ered the ramifications of the broad language contained in its R. C. Can
decision. The Shop Rite case involved an unauthorized walk-out by
188. Id. See also NLRB v. Rubber Rolls, Inc., 388 F.2d 71, 73 (3rd Cir. 1967).
189. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). See also NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery,
Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965).
190. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967).
191. 419 F.2d at 217.
192. Id. at 219.
193. Id. at 221. Since there was no allegation that the union had not been repre-
senting the interests of the minority employees fairly, the court expressly refrained
from deciding whether such a fair representation breach would legally permit them to
engage in otherwise unprotected concerted activity. Id. See also Sunbeam Corp., 184
N.L.R.B. No. 117, 74 L.R.R.M. 1712 (1970), aff'd sub nom., Moore v. Sunbeam Corp.,
79 L.R.R.M. 2803 (7th Cir. 1972).
194. 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970).
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a group of employees which occurred during collective bargaining
aimed at reaching an agreement. However, the strike was only indi-
rectly related to the negotiations, since it was aimed at protesting the
discharge of an employee who had apparently been caught damaging
company merchandise in an effort to induce the employer to accept
the union's bargaining demands. When they initially learned of the
employee's termination, several workers went to the company mana-
ger's office to protest the action. Their lack of success in this regard
was followed by a spontaneous work stoppage. Immediately after
their strike commenced, the participants proceeded to the union hall
to confer with the union field representative who told them to con-
tinue their picketing while he sought to obtain official strike sanction
from the union district director. Unfortunately for the strikers, this
authorization was refused. Several days later, after the strikers were
informed that -their work stoppage was unauthorized, they sought re-
instatement, but were denied reemployment.
The Fifth Circuit accepted the Labor Board's finding that the
strikers had effectively been terminated on the day they initially
walked out, but it rejected the Board's decision to afford them NLRA
protection based upon the reasoning of the R. C. Can decision. The
Shop Rite court initially distinguished R. C. Can by noting that the
strikers there were supporting a very specific union position which had
been previously communicated to the employer through the negotia-
tion process.'95 The court warned:
If union objectives are characterized in general terms-such as
wages, job security, conditions of employment and the like--one
can assume that in a great majority of instances minority action
will be consistent with one or more of those objectives. If R. C.
Can is not applied with great care, it would allow minority action
in a broad range of situations and permit unrestrained undercut-
ting of collective bargaining. 196
However, the court next cited -the Fifth Circuit's intervening Cactus
Petroleum9 7 decision which had ignored R. C. Can in favor of the
Draper rationale, and it indicated its belief that "R. C. Can is of doubt-
ful validity."'19  In addition, the court reasoned that "[t]he failure
of the [dissident] group . . . to notify their bargaining representative
that they desired to contest [the other employee's] discharge could
only undermine the goals of democracy in the unions and effective
195. Id. at 790.
196. Id.
197. NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755, 761 (5th Cir. 1966).
198. 430 F.2d at 790-91.
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labor adjustment through the bargaining process." 19 9 On the basis of
this observation, the court sustained the employer's refusal to grant
the strikers reinstatement.
The final case to be considered in this section is NLRB v. Uni-
versal Services, Inc. & Associates.2"' In Universal Services, several
workers who were dissatisfied with certain action by their employer de-
cided to engage in a strike, even though their union had implemented
the grievance machinery regarding the matter and had warned them
that such a walk out was against the rules. The court, in deciding that
this unauthorized conduct was not protected by the NLRA stressed the
need for "union solidarity and cohesiveness.
20 1
[RIepresentatives were ready and willing to speak for the men,
and they informed the men "as best they could" that the griev-
ances raised were being dealt with, and were optimistically ap-
praised by the union. ...
Any doubt that the men had at this critical point should have
been resolved in favor of the union leadership ...
The freedom of action withheld from the individual laborer in a
case of this nature is more than compensated by a resultant
strengthening of the negotiating position of the collective whole.
And, upon the strength of the group vis-a-vis the employer rests
the ultimate security of the individual workers.
202
Analysis of D.C. Circuit Holding
The Emporium court majority endeavored to harmonize its deci-
sion with the established line of precedent regarding the exclusivity
doctrine. In so doing, it acknowledged that the picketers' conduct es-
sentially rendered the remedial provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement ineffective; however, it concluded that the degree
of interference with the exclusive, bargaining status of the union was
not sufficient to deprive the concerted activities of the protection of
the act.20 3  This determination rested on three factors: (1) the mi-
nority resorted to independent concerted activity only after having pre-
sented their grievances to the union representative; (2) the minority
abandoned the pending grievance procedure -after the union had de-
clined to proceed on a "group?' basis; and (3) the union and the mi-
199. Id. at 791.
200. 467 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1972).
201. Id. at 585-88.
202. Id.
203. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 931 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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nority were working for a common purpose-elimination of racial dis-
crimination in employment.
20 4
From -the foregoing historical development of the major cases
dealing with unauthorized employee conduct in derogation of the "ex-
clusivity" status of collective bargaining representatives, it should be
quite apparent that the Emporium decision actually constitutes a sig-
nificant departure from the weight of judicial precedent. Notwith-
standing the fact that the union and the minority faction both sought
the same objective, the picketer's activity disrupted the collective bar-
gaining process. Under the more widely accepted view, this factor
is sufficient in itself to justify the denial of NLRA protection.20 5
In its Emporium decision, the D. C. Circuit majority announced
a novel test to be applied by the Labor Board in evaluating the pro-
tected nature, under the NLRA, of unauthorized concerted activity di-
rected against alleged employment discrimination.
[T]he Labor Board should inquire . . . whether the union was
actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent pos-
sible, by the most expedient and efficacious means. Where the
union's efforts fall short of this high standard, the minority group's
concerted activities cannot lose its [sic] section 7 protection.
20 6
Thus, the Emporium majority further deviated from precedent by
shifting -the focus of analysis from the effect of a minority group's ac-
tivity to the conduct of the labor organization. Moreover, in its zeal-
ous effort to be innovative, the D. C. Circuit majority apparently ig-
nored the fact that the NLRB is only empowered to interpret and ap-
ply the statutory provisions of the NLRA.
For an administrative agency which owes its very existence
to the statutory expression of congressional intent to enter upon
grounds not intended for it seems a clear breach of the administra-
tive function. An administrative agency does not have the tradi-
tional power of a court to fashion for itself, and for those over
whom it presides, abstract concepts of right and wrong. Adminis-
trative agencies are created to execute and administer the con-
gressional will as expressed, not to decide what Congress should
have said.
20 7
With this guiding principle in mind, the relevant provisions of
the NLRA should first be examined to discern whether the D. C. Cir-
cuit's holding comports with the basic policies underlying the Congres-
sional enactment of that Act.
204. Id.
205. See text accompanying notes 167-202 supra.
206. 485 F.2d at 931 (emphasis in original).
207. Note, Racial Discrimination and the NLRB: The Hughes Tool Case, 50
VA. L. REV. 1221, 1235 (1964).
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Relevant NLRA Policies
Two vital considerations which were recognized by the D. C. Cir-
cuit majority should be mentioned at the outset. First, although -the
dissident Emporium employees asserted that they had merely been
seeking the opportunity to discuss "grievances" with their employer,
the court expressly accepted the finding of the trial examiner that their
actions involved "no mere presentation of a grievance, but nothing
short of a demand that [the Company] bargain with the picketing em-
ployees for the entire group of minority employees. ' 208  It is therefore
apparent -that the protection which might otherwise have been pro-
vided them by the proviso to section 9(a) could not be availed upon,
since their actions substantially transcended the narrow "grievance"
right afforded by that proviso.20 9 The court also acknowledged the
fact that there was "nothing in the record . . . to indicate that the
union's decision to remedy the charges of discrimination by proceed-
ing on an individual rather than a group or class basis was made in
bad faith. The union may well have thought that it had chosen the
most efficacious method to handle the charges ... ."10 For this
reason, it is clear that the court was not concerned with any possible
union breach of its duty of fair representation. 211 Thus, the court was
not affording the minority workers protection based upon any theory
of "self defense" against unfair labor practice violations by their statu-
tory representative.
It has been recognized that "labor legislation is peculiarly
the product of legislative compromise of strongly held views" and that
an NLRA provision "must be construed in light of the fact that it is
only one of many interwoven sections in a complex act. ' 21 2  When
section 7213 is examined in this light, it becomes apparent that the Em-
porium court's effort to provide unionized, minority protesters with
statutory protection is not supportable by NLRA considerations. It
208. 485 F.2d at 929 n.34.
209. See notes 160-66 & accompanying text supra.
210. 485 F.2d at 930. It must be remembered that not only had the union nego-
tiated a broad no-discrimination clause, but it was also endeavoring to enforce this pro-
vision through the grievance-arbitration machinery when the dissident minority group
decided to withdraw its needed assistance from the union effort, in favor of unautho-
rized action which it believed would produce more rapid results. It is indeed ironic
to observe the extreme cost and delay which has occurred as a result of the dissident's
decision.
211. See text accompanying notes 111-51 supra.
212. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179 (1967). See National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1967).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), set out in note 22 supra.
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is both contrary to the legislative history of the act and inconsistent
with important policies embodied in that enactment.
The NLRA was certainly not intended to prohibit general em-
ployment discrimination. "The NLRA is primarily concerned with the
protection of the workers' right to self-organization-and with racial
discrimination only to the limited extent that it interferes with that
right. '214  The legislative history of the Labor Act makes this point
quite clear. During the debates surrounding the passage of the Wag-
ner Act in 1935, many civil rights groups protested the fact that no
direct protection was afforded to minority employees.2 15 The meager
Taft-Harley debates regarding the employment discrimination area
also demonstrate the Congressional desire not to become involved
with this issue.216 Furthermore, efforts in 1953 to have the NLRA
amended to proscribe general employment discrimination were wholly
unsuccessful.2 17  A similar effort in 1964 was similarly defeated, in
favor of the enactment of Title VI. 21 8 Therefore, unless some spe-
cific NLRA provision may be construed as providing minority diss-
dents with protection, it is quite apparent that the Labor Act itself
does not help them.
Although concerted employee activity aimed at the alleviation of
employment discrimination is generally legitimate conduct2 10 which
may not be interfered with by employer action,120 it must be remem-
bered that such group efforts are not absolutely protected. When they
violate some other basic Federal labor policy, their protection will be
forfeited.
The exclusivity principle embodied in section 9(a) of the
act makes it expressly clear that employees who are represented by
a designated bargaining agent may not engage in unauthorized con-
certed activity which undermines the protected status of their repre-
sentative and which disrupts the stable bargaining relationship exist-
214. Note, Title VII, the NLRB, and Arbitration: Conflicts in National Labor
Policy, 5 GA. L. REv. 313, 343 (1971). "Mhe seminal purpose of the NLRB is to
protect workers' rights to bargain collectively and not to prevent racial discrimination."
Id. at 348; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1970).
215. See Albert, supra note 69, at 550-51.
216. See id. at 551-52.
217. S. 1831, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). Although referred to the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, it was never reported out. 99 CONG. REc. 4437 (1953).
See Sherman, supra note 61, at 808.
218. See Sherman, supra note 61, at 808.
219. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
220. See cases cited note 104 supra.
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ing between their union and employer.2 21  It should be realized that
the types of activity sanctioned by the Emporium court's holding would
negate important congressional objectives expressed in the exclusivity
doctrine. Furthermore, other specific statutory provisons would be
abrogated.
As both the Labor Board and the D. C. Circuit recognized, the
Emporium employees sought the right to negotiate for minority work-
ers separately from their selected bargaining representative.222  Such
action, if protected, would place the employer in a completely unten-
able position, and it would wholly ignore the rights of the other em-
ployees. If the employer were to refuse to bargain with the dissident
faction, he would face the prospect of economic injury perpetrated by
their continued concerted activity. 23 On the other hand, if the em-
ployer were to recognize and negotiate with the minority group regard-
ing employment conditions, he would be guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tice for bargaining with other than the designated representative,
2 24
221. See generally text accompanying notes 152-201 supra.
222. See 192 N.L.R.B. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671; 485 F.2d at 929 n.34.
223. It is interesting to note the Emporium court's apparent unawareness of the
possibility that the concerted activity utilized by the dissident workers in that particular
case may well have constituted a breach of the contractual no-strike provision. Such
a breach by regular employees is clearly unprotected under the NLRA. See NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S.
332 (1939). See also Getman, supra note 169, at 1248. The court similarly ignored
the fact that the consumer boycott may have violated the accepted principle that an
employer is not obligated to continue to employ workers who wish to receive pay while
engaging in quasi-strike activities aimed at injuring their employer. See Hoover Co.
v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 390 (6th Cir. 1951): "It is a wrong done to the company
for employees, while being employed and paid wages by a company, to engage in a
boycott to prevent others from purchasing what their employer is engaged in selling
and which is the very thing their employer is paying them to produce. An employer
is not required, under the Act, to finance a boycott against himself." See NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
The Emporium court may also have improperly failed to consider specific NLRA
provisions which may quite arguably have applied to that case. For example, the dissi-
dent's demand that they negotiate only with the Emporium president, even though he
instructed them to talk with the personnel director, may have violated NLRA § 8(b)
(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970), which guarantees an employer the unfet-
tered discretion to select whomever he chooses to be his bargaining representative.
Furthermore, NLRA § 8(b)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1970), and § 8(b)
(4) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (1970), expressly protect an employer from pick-
eting and other coercive activity where he has already granted legal recognition to a
labor organization. See Black Power, supra note 6, at 72-77.
It is certainly hoped that the D. C. Circuit did not mean to imply that minority
dissidents are to be provided with carte blanche when protesting alleged employment
discrimination, irrespective of such established NLRA limitations.
224. The employer would be in violation of NLRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a)(5) (1970). See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
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and the rights of the majority of employees who originally selected
a labor organization as their bargaining agent would be violated.1
25
Thus, in the absence of some evidence demonstrating that the major-
ity workers and the employer are acting invidiously to injure the mi-
nority employees, it is believed that NLRA protection with respect to
such minority action is both unnecessary and improper.
Although the protection provided to minority protestors under the
D. C. Circuit's decision could easily result in a serious disruption of
the federal policy favoring orderly collective bargaining through exclu-
sive representatives, such a result might be justifiable if such minori-
ties had no other effective means available to adequately enforce their
recognized right to non-discriminatory employment. 2 6  However, with
a virtual plethora of non-disruptive avenues of relief available to mi-
nority employees, 211 such a holding is indefensible.
Non-Disruptive Remedial Alternatives
Probably the first avenues of relief which the Emporium court
should have recognized in a case involving the interpretation and ap-
plication of the NLRA are the remedies available under that act. It
was the D. C. Circuit itself which enunciated the rationale rendering
discrimination by an employer acting alone an unfair labor practice. 2-
Furthermore, should the bargaining representative fail to endeavor in
good faith to alleviate any invidious employment discrimination, it
would clearly breach its duty of fair representation, and relief could
be obtained from either a judicial forum 2 9 or the NLRB.23 °
Certainly the most widely used and most expedient method of
eliminating employment discrimination, where there is a collective bar-
225. See International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961), wherein the Court recognized the impropriety of an employer granting bargain-
ing recognition to a minority union, even where the union and the employer are acting
in good faith and with no intention to disenfranchise the majority workers improperly.
226. See Note, Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 656, 664 (1974). See also Note, Title VII and NLRA: Protection of Extra-
Union Opposition to Employment Discrimination, 72 MICH. L. REv. 313, 330-31
(1973).
227. "Remedies in some areas, such as employment discrimination on account of
race or sex, run like water." Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflict-
ing Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 30 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Meltzer].
228. See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). See notes 105-10 & accompanying text su-
pra.
229. See text accompanying notes 114-36 supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 137-51 supra.
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gaining representative, is the contractual grievance-arbitration proc-
ess.231 At least 94 percent of the negotiated contracts in the United
States provide for binding arbitration as the dispute resolution proce-
dure.23 2  In addition, "the growing practice of incorporating non-dis-
crimination clauses into collective agreements 'and the demonstrated
willingness of arbitrators to enforce such clauses augurs well . . *"233
Even where the agreement does not contain an express no-discrimina-
tion clause, other provisions, such as the "just cause" for discharge
requirement, may be utilized to prevent invidious discrimination.2 34  A
few arbitrators will even incorporate Title VIE principles into the col-
lective agreement.235  Of course, the availability of arbitration relief
is usually dependent upon the commitment of labor organizations to
oppose discriminatory practices, since only they usually possess the
contractual authority to invoke this remedial procedure. 23 6  However,
the fair representation duty237 will usually encourage unions to resolve
doubts in favor of proceeding to arbitration rather than risk liability
for failure to act. Furthermore, while some have questioned the abil-
ity of white-dominated unions to present fairly the cases of disadvan-
taged minorities,233 it is interesting to note "the relatively few reported
cases in which arbitration awards have been challenged in Title VII
proceedings. '239  With this significant remedial channel available, it
231. This is the dispute settlement procedure favored under the NLRA. See
NLRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970). The NLRB not only gives deference
in unfair labor practice cases to prior arbitration awards covering the same basic issues,
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), but it will even hold its proceedings
in abeyance pending resolution of the question by a future arbitration decision. Coil-
yer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431
(1963); see Revised Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel Nash on Arbitration De-
ferral Policy Under Collyer, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 9031 (1973). See also Johanne-
.,en & Smith, Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723 (1972); Note, The NLRB's
Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer: The Impact of National Radio Co., 53
B.U.L. REv. 711 (1973); Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J
1191 (1968). However, the fact that an employee has received an unfavorable arbitra-
tion award does not preclude resort to the Labor Board's unfair labor practice processes
in all cases. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768 (1967); Ray-
theon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
232. BNA, [1970] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 38.
233. Rosen, supra note 58, at 749 & cases cited note 85 supra; see Peck, supra
uote 58, at 483.
234. See Peck, supra note 58, at 483.
235. See Note, The Authority and Obligation of a Labor Arbitrator, 32 Omo ST.
L. REv. 395 (1971). But see Labor Arbitration, supra note 60, at 47.
236. See Peck, supra note 58, at 483.
237. See text accompanying notes 111-51 supra.
238. See Labor Arbitration, supra note 60, at 46-47.
239. Meltzer, supra note 227, at 50; see Comment, Final Determination Through
is clear that economic coercion during the term of the negotiated con-
tract should not be permitted.24 °
Aside from NLRA and arbitration relief, many other administra-
tive or judicial remedies are available. Thirty-eight states have Fair
Employment Practice Commissions which may afford a worker relief
against employment discrimination. 4' Effective assistance is also pro-
vided by the broad discrimination proscription of Title VII. 21 2  The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 may also be utilized by individuals who have
suffered from racial discrimination practiced by employers or un-
ions. 43 It should finally be noted that if the employer involved has
any direct or indirect contractual relations with the Federal Govern-
ment, the anti-discrimination relief provided by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance under Executive Order 11246 might be avail-
able.
244
Despite the availability of all of these nondisruptive means of
obtaining relief from employment discrimination, the Emporium court
Arbitration of Employee's Claim of Discrimination Does Not Preclude Title VII Ac-
tion, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1316, 1317 (1970). It is now clear that a prior arbitration
award will not bar a subsequent title VII suit. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 94
S. Ct. 1011 (1974). Furthermore, independent of a minority employee's right to file
a subsequent title VII suit challenging both employer action underlying the arbitration
proceeding and a union's discriminatory handling of his grievance, a worker may also
file suit against both the employer and the labor organization under section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967). See also Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324
(1969).
240. The presence of a binding grievence-arbitration procedure for the resolution
of contractual disputes impliedly imposes a no-strike obligation upon the employees.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 94 S. Ct. 629, 639; Team-
sters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See also Boys Mkts., Inc.
v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Cox, supra note 169, at 329.
241. See Peck, supra note 58, at 491-94; Note, Implementing Governmental Policy
Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 23 FLA. L. REV. 157, 158-59 & n.12
(1970).
242. See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
243. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pain, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (emphasis added); see Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
911 (1970); Peck, supra note 58, at 475-79. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
244. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1967); see Peck, supra note 58, at
489-91; Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government
Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 590 (1969).
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maintained that the NLRA, when read in conjunction with the princi-
ples underlying Title VII, should be interpreted as protecting unau-
thorized, concerted activity aimed at alleged racial discrimination in
employment.2 45 It is believed, however, that the principles evidenced
in Title VII do not require such a result.
Title VII Considerations
Although the discretion provided to a Federal administrative
agency by its enabling legislation "does not necessarily include either
the duty or the authority to execute numerous other laws," in applying
its own enactment, an agency cannot "wholy ignore other. . . equally
important Congressional objectives. 12 46  Thus, when two different leg-
islative enactments basically regulate the same general area, an effort
should be made, where possible, to harmonize the underlying poli-
cies of both so that the objectives of neither act are unnecessarily sac-
rificed. In its apparent desire to achieve a predetermined result, the
Emporium court ignored the fact that such an effort requires reciprocal
consideration of the principles and policies of both enactments. Unless
the activity in question has been expressly authorized and specifically
protected by Title VII, the Labor Board should not be expected to
negate substantial NLRA policies automatically merely because the
particular participants in the challenged action are acting in the noble
name of employment justice. 47  Furthermore, it must be remembered
that Title VII, while boldly proscribing the most pervasive forms of
invidious employment discrimination, certainly did not sanction all
means which private individuals might select to achieve the desired ob-
jective.
The most relevant provision of Title VII is section 704(a),248
which provides inter alia:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for em-
ployment. . . because he has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by this subchapter...
245. See Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 926-29
(D.C. Cir. 1973). "Mhe Board should have recognized that in light of Title VU1,
concerted activity involving racial discrimination is quite distinct from other concerted
activity." Id. at 928.
246. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
247. See Note, Title VII and NLRA: Protection of Extra-Union Opposition to
Employment Discrimination, 72 MICH. L. Rnv. 313, 326 (1973).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1970), which proscribes all employment discrimination based upon race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. See authorities cited note 61 supra.
However, there is nothing in the record of the Emporium case to indi-
cate that the employer had terminated the two dissidents because they
opposed his alleged discriminatory practices. His decision was instead
based upon the manner in which they expressed their opposition. Not
even the specific language of section 704(a)-let alone the general
language of any NLRA provision-permits the utilization of any
means to challenge alleged discrimination. In Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,249 -the Eighth Circuit expressly recognized that through
section 704(a), "Congress sought to protect employees and job appli-
cants from employer retaliation for filing complaints to the EEOC
... . Without doubt, lawful protest also commands the same protec-
tion, but we find no suggestion that protection extends to activities
which run afoul of the law. ' 250  Although Green was vacated by the
Supreme Court on appeal, it is important to note that the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of section 704(a) was not challenged. 251  Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court gratuitously stated that section 704(a) "relates
solely to discrimination against an applicant or employee on account
of his participation in legitimate civil rights activities or protests
.. *252 Perhaps even more important is the fact that the Supreme
Court expressly recognized that "[niothing in Title VII compels an em-
ployer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in . . . deliberate,
unlawful activity against it."'253 In support of this principle, the Court
cited a case denying NLRA protection to employees who had engaged
in unlawful conduct.2 4 The Court's reasoning suggests that NLRA poli-
cies should be considered when deciding whether to provide Title VII
protection for particular activity. Thus, such established Labor Board
doctrines as -the exclusivity principle should not be ignored merely be-
cause a minority is protesting alleged employment discrimination.
Another incongruous aspect of the Emporium court's deci-
sion concerns the manner in which the D. C. Circuit effectively re-
versed the burdens of proof under both Title VII and the NLRA. Un-
less a labor organization is endeavoring to alleviate alleged discrimina-
tion "to the fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and effica-
249. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
250. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
251. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 797 n.6 (1973).
252. Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 803.
254. The case cited was NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), wherein
the Court upheld the right of an employer to discharge workers who had engaged in
a sit-down strike.
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cious means, '255 it would be forced to forfeit its right to be free from
divisive and disruptive dissension. Notwithstanding the difficulty of
comprehending the meaning of the court's extremely vague language,
it is relatively clear that a union will be required to demonstrate the
sufficiency of its remedial efforts in order ,to retain its "exclusivity"
protection. Yet, under both Title V11 25 ,and the NLRA, 5 7 it is the
charging party who must establish the improper conduct of the de-
fending party. The court unfortunately failed to provide a convincing
explanation for this burden of proof reversal.
If it could be established that the vast majority of labor organiza-
tions fail to act properly to rectify invidious employment discrimina-
tion, the Emporium court's implicit ruling might not be too unreason-
able. However, while many unions have had undistinguished civil
rights records,2 58 many others have taken forceful action to eradicate
this pernicious problem. 59 It is therefore wholly impermissible to es-
tablish such a general presumption against the good faith of all labor
organizations.28 0
[A] union's hostility toward its civil rights conscious members in
no way establishes its hostility to the goal of non-discrimination.
It is quite possible for the union to take the most severe measures
against various types of independent action such as wildcat strikes
and yet be in total agreement with a policy which would remedy
the irritations or injustices which gave rise to the stoppage. 261
The Emporium court's effort to impose upon unions an adverse pre-
sumption which transcends any standard established under Title VII
cannot be sustained under the fundamental principles of either Title
VII or the NLRA.262 The D. C. Circuit's attempt to "harmo-
255. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 931 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (emphasis in original).
256. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Hutch-
ings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 1970).
257. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193-95 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB,
413 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969).
258. See Sovern, supra note 69, at 565.
259. See id. at 566; Rosen, supra note 61, at 758.
260. See Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961), wherein the
Court held that it could "not assume that a union conducts its operations in violation
of law. . . ." See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791, 798 (1974).
261. Black Power, supra note 6, at 60.
262. The Emporium court apparently excused the fact that the minority dissidents
caused most of the problems for the labor organization with respect to its utilization
of the grievance-arbitration machinery by refusing to provide needed cooperation when
things did not progress exactly as they desired. Cf. Patmon v. Van Dor Co., 6 F.E.P.
Cases 821 (N.D. Ohio 1973), in which the court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment in a fair representation suit where the unions processed the com-
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nize" these two enactments has really effectuated the policies of
neither act, while doing violence to the underlying tenets of both.
2 13
Constitutional Considerations
Although the Labor Board is basically not a "fair employment"
agency, it is an administrative branch of the federal government. It
may not, therefore, engage in any action which affirmatively supports
invidious discrimination by private parties.264 For this reason, "the
Board cannot validly render aid under Section 9 of the [Labor] Act
to a labor organization which discriminates racially when acting as a
statutory bargaining representative."'266 Since the collective bargain-
ing authority and concomitant "exclusivity" protection provided to un-
ions emanate from section 9(a) of the NLRA,2 6 it would certainly
violate established constitutional principles for the NLRB to protect
actively the representative status of labor organizations which practice
plainant's grievance to the point where his own refusal to cooperate prevented the
unions from proceeding further.
263. It should be noted that if the Supreme Court were to eschew the analysis
of this article in favor of that developed by the D. C. Circuit, several important policy
issues would have to be resolved. For example: (1) may the self-designated minority
"agent" represent all minority workers, or may he only speak for those who have spe-
cifically authorized him; (2) may such an "agent" represent minority workers with re-
spect to any areas of interest to such individuals, or must he confine his negotiations
to matters of direct and particular interest to minority employees; (3) would such an
"agent" be under at least a quasi-fair representation duty vis-a-vis those minority work-
ers he does represent; and (4) would the agent be under any fair representation obli-
gation with respect to the non-minority employees in the general bargaining unit who
might be affected by any minority agreement reached.
264. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1973). See generally Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor
Union and "Governmental Action," 70 YAIx L.J. 345 (1961). See also Henkin, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
265. Independent Metal Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577 (1964).
"When a governmental agency recognizes such a [discriminatory] union to be the bar-
gaining representative it significantly becomes a willing participant in the union's dis-
criminatory practices. Although the union itself is not a government instrumentality
the National Labor Relations Board is." NLRB v. Mansion House Center Manage-
ment Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 1973); see Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
54 (1962); Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination By Labor Unions, 50
GEo. L.J. 457, 458-75 (1962); Note, Union Racial Discrimination: A Liberalized
Standard of Proof, 58 MINN. L. Rev. 335 (1973). See also St. Antoine, Color Blind-
ness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private"
Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Note, NLRB v. Mansion House
Center Management Corp., 7 GA. L. Rav. 770, 776-81 (1973).
266. See Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation:
The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 712 & n.13 (1964).
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illegal discrimination. However, this fact does not support a result as
broad as that enunciated by the D. C. Circuit.
In its Emporium decision, the circuit court imposed upon labor
organizations an affirmative obligation substantially exceeding that
previously recognized by any federal court. Although the Supreme
Court has not yet specifically considered the precise question raised
in the Emporium case, it has on several occasions addressed itself to
the fair representation duty which is a constitutional prerequisite to
the enjoyment of the statutory protection of the NLRA.2 67 In Steele,
the Court held that a union is duty-bound "to exercise fairly 'the power
conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hos-
tile discrimination against them."268  Surely this standard which auto-
matically prohibits any discrimination based upon racial or other sim-
ilarly invidious distinctions269 satisfies constitutional requirements.
Therefore, unless there is some demonstration that a labor organiza-
tion is failing to prosecute the grievances of minority workers fully and
fairly, or is otherwise shirking its representational obligations, it should
not be capriciously deprived of its exclusive representative status. This
is true regardless of the actions which an employer may have taken.
The Emporium court may well have imposed its strict standard
not so much in response to any unfair representation by the union,
but more in an effort to deny the allegedly discriminating employer
the right to terminate the dissident protesters. Although this might
at first blush appear to be a reasonable attempt to require the Labor
Board to deny the protection of the NLRA to a possibly discriminating
party, it overlooks two crucial factors. The first concerns the fact that
the employer in the Emporium case was not in any manner seeking
protection of the Act or the assistance of the NLRB when it discharged
the two protesting employees. The employer obviously believed that
the workers' openly expressed disloyalty and total disregard for the
contractually-established method for peaceful resolution of employ-
ment disputes warranted dismissal. Thus, it is clear that only the pro-
testers themselves sought the affirmative assistance of the federal
agency, and by its denial of relief, the NLRB clearly did not become
unconstitutionally enmeshed in any discriminatory scheme.
The second vital consideration relates to the fact 'that the exclu-
sivity principle applied by the Labor Board to uphold the Emporium
267. See notes 114-21 & accompanying text supra.
268. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944) (emphasis
added).
269. See id. at 203.
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discharges only indirectly assists the employer. While he is an inci-
dental beneficiary of this policy, it must be remembered that its pri-
mary functions are to protect the rights of the majority employees
who originally selected the union as their bargaining representa-
tive and to protect the general public against easily avoidable and inex-
cusable interruptions of commerce. Therefore, except in those in-
stances where it can be shown that the minority workers are not being
treated fairly by the majority employees or are being improperly rep-
resented by the designated negotiating agent, a court should be most
hesitant to abrogate the established "exclusivity" doctrine merely in
order to punish an allegedly discriminating employer. Since the Em-
porium court conceded both -that there was no evidence to indicate any
bad faith on the part of the union involved and that that organization
may in fact have proceeded in the manner which it reasonably be-
lieved would produce the optimal and most lasting results,27 ° the
court's decision is certainly not sustainable on constitutional grounds.2
Suggested Approach
When the Labor Board is presented with factual circumstances
even remotely resembling those involved in the Emporium situation,
"[t]he individual's interest in the employment relationship should be
protected by the law to the fullest extent compatible with the contin-
ued effectiveness of the collective bargaining process." '272  If an em-
ployee or group of employees merely attempt to discuss the adjustment
of "grievances"2 73 with their employer, and no further action is under-
taken, clearly the proviso to section 9(a) would afford them NLRA
protection. 274  However, where separate collective bargaining in dero-
270. See Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917,
929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
271. If the Emporium case is ultimately remanded to the Labor Board, it should
naturally be permitted to consider whether the leaflets distributed by the dissident pro-
testers, see text accompanying note 19 supra, either evidenced such disloyalty or were
so offensive in tone as to warrant in themselves a denial of NLRA protection. See
NLRB v. Electrical Workers, Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Southwestern Bell Tel-
ephone Co., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 82 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1972); Stuart F. Cooper Co.,
136 N.L.R.B. 142 (1962); E.E. Majeroni, dba Home Restaurant Drive-In, 127 N.L.R.B.
635 (1960); Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956); E.A. Laboratories, Inc.,
88 N.L.R.B. 673 (1950).
272. Blumrosen, supra note 127, at 1572.
273. See note 164 & accompanying text supra, regarding the narrow definition of
"grievance."
274. See notes 161-66 & accompanying text supra. Although a union can legiti-
mately waive certain otherwise protected employee rights during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement it is quite apparent that it could not waive such a fundamental
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gation of a union's exclusive status is sought, or concerted activity un-
authorized by the representative labor organization is undertaken, the
established "exclusivity" principle275 should, under normal circum-
stances, render the conduct unprotected.
It could be argued that the liberal R.C. Can'76 test should be uti-
lized to enable minority dissidents 'to engage in all peaceful concerted
activity which does not violate any contractual restriction and which
supports the substantive position of the union. However, if this
broad standard were applied in cases involving alleged employment
discrimination, it should be apparent that the action would, a fortiori,
always be accorded protection, since both Title VII and the NLRA duty
of fair representation clearly obligate a labor organization to oppose
proscribed discrimination. The fact that most courts which have con-
sidered the question 277 have adopted the much more narrowly drawn
Draper test 278 provides substantial support for the conclusion -that such
unauthorized minority actions should not generally be protected. A
further consideration should prove to be conclusive.
The timing with respect to the utilization of economic weapons
by a labor organization usually forms a critical part of its negotiating
strategy.2 9 If a group of dissident employees were permitted to dis-
rupt vital union plans by engaging in conduct constituting an untimely
preemption of the representative's major weapon, they could com-
pletely destroy that agent's bargaining effectiveness, in total disregard
of the rights of the majority employees. Therefore, "independent
employee pressure contrary to the wishes of the union-even in sup-
port of the union's bargaining position-should be treated as a form of
independent bargaining and, hence, unprotected, '280 unless conduct
by the union is so opprobrious as to warrant a forfeiture of its exclu-
sivity protection.28'
individual right as that expressed in the proviso to section 9(a). See, e.g., Mastro Plas-
tics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (right to strike); NLRB v. Rockaway
News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (right to refuse to cross a picketline); cf. NLRB
v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974).
275. See text accompanying notes 152-201 supra.
276. See text accompanying note 187 supra.
277. See text accompanying notes 167-201 supra. Even the Fifth Circuit which
originally decided the R. C. Can case has subsequently reconsidered the matter and has
basically accepted the Draper approach. See notes 194-99 & accompanying text supra.
278. See notes 173-76 & accompanying text supra.
279. See Black Power, supra note 6, at 59.
280. Getman, supra note 169, at 1243.
281. Such opprobrious union "conduct" could, of course, entail inexcusable inac-
tion as well as invidious action.
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Where the federally protected right of minority workers to equal
employment opportunity is being emasculated by unfair union repre-
sentation, the affected minority employees, and their sincere support-
ers, should not be unconscionably straight-jacketed by application of
the exclusivity doctrine. Under such circumstances, it would not only
violate the fundamental principle embodied in section 704(a) of Title
VII,252 but it would also constitute an impermissible deprivation of the
minority employees' constitutional rights,2" 3 for a federal enactment to
be enforced in a manner which denied them the opportunity to resort
to peaceful self-help protest action. However, a negation of the "ex-
clusivity" rules should not be permitted in conjunction with the mere
allegation of a fair representation breach. 84 A far more substantial
prerequisite must be imposed, lest the exception be permitted effec-
tively to engulf the rule.
Minority dissidents should only be allowed the protected right to
engage in unauthorized concerted activity when -their union represen-
tative has in fact violated the duty of fair representation owed to such
individuals. Such a standard would afford minority union members
the same type of protection currently accorded workers who cease
working due to abnormally dangerous conditions of employment.28
However, as is recognized with respect to section 502 coverage, a good
faith subjective belief that their labor organization has breached its ob-
ligation should not be sufficient to provide such workers with protec-
tion; rather, a reasonable objective standard should be utilized.2"6
Thus, where minority workers can objectively demonstrate that their
statutory representative has violated its duty of fair representa-
tion, they should be permitted to engage in peaceful concerted activi-
ties aimed at the preservation of their own protected right to employ-
ment justice. 28 7
282. See text accompanying note 248 supra.
283. See notes 264-65 & accompanying text supra.
284. Cf. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. RV. 151, 171 (1957).
285. L.M.R.A. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), provides in relevant part that "the
quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally
dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or em-
ployees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this Act."
286. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 94 S. Ct. 623,
640-41 (1974); Redwing Carriers Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1209 (1961).
287. As is true with respect to a section 502 work stoppage, such self-defense ac-
tion by minority employees should not be regarded as violating a contractual no-strike
provision. See 94 S. Ct. at 640-41; Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894, 906
(1962); Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 146 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1957); cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (general
no-strike clause does not prohibit a strike in response to substantial unfair labor prac-
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The standard suggested here no doubt imposes a strict limitation
on the right of minority dissenters to engage in unauthorized concerted
activity, for it is recognized that a breach of a union's fair representa-
tion duty is frequently quite difficult to prove.2" 8 Nonetheless, it is
believed that such a requirement is not unreasonable, in light of the
veritable plethora of non-disruptive avenues of relief available to indi-
viduals suffering from discriminatory employment practices.289 While
this result certainly impinges upon the freedom of such employees,
it cannot be forgotten that any protected freedom permitted to such
workers not only negates the statutory rights of their labor union, the
majority employees, and -the employer, but 'also adversely affects the
general public. Such dire consequences are defensible only where the
majority workers, through their bargaining agent, have in fact deprived
members of a minority faction of their fair representation right. While
it would be unconscionable to afford these latter employees less pro-
tection than this, it should be clear 'that nothing in the NLRA, Title
VII, or the Constitution requires the granting of greater safeguards.
Conclusion
In its Emporium decision, the D. C. Circuit endeavored to pro-
vide minority employees who wish to protest alleged employment dis-
crimination expansive freedom to engage in possibly disruptive, con-
certed activity not authorized by their bargaining representative.
While the court may have been motivated by the most altruistic princi-
ples, its holding is without support in the NLRA, Title VII, or consti-
tutional considerations. It wholly ignores established Labor Act doc-
trines as well as recognized Title VII policies. Furthermore, the cor-
responding deprivation of the rights of labor organizations, majority
workers, employers, and the general public sanctioned by the Empo-
rium case is clearly unwarranted in light of the many .non-disruptive,
remedial alternatives available to minority dissidents. Thus, the re-
sult achieved by the D. C. Circuit should not be sustained. Rather,
the courts should recognize that such minority employees may only
engage in unauthorized concerted activity where their bargaining
agent has in fact violated the duty of fair representation owed by it
to such individuals. Such a rule would afford minority workers the
tices by an employer). But see Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961) (limit-
ing scope of Mastro Plastics freedom to "serious, unfair labor practices").
288. See Meltzer, supra note 227, at 45; Boyce, supra note 69, at 242. See also
Sovern, supra note 69, at 598-99.
289. See text accompanying notes 167-201 supra.
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protected right to utilize reasonable measures of self-preservation
where they can objectively demonstrate that their union representative
is not fairly and adequately protecting their vital interests in equal em-
ployment opportunity. Where, however, such a breach of the union's
obligation of fair representation cannot be established, resort to non-
disruptive contractual, administrative, and/or judicial remedies should
afford the minority dissidents sufficient protection.
